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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 36 AUGUST 1991 NUMBER 3-4
RECUSAL STANDARDS FOR JUDGES IN PENNSYLVANIA:
CAUSE FOR CONCERN
KENNETH S. KILIMNIK*
I. INTRODUCTIONC HANGES are afoot in the regulation of judicial conduct on a
national and state level.' Nationally, the American Bar Asso-
* J.D. 1980 (Northeastern University); LL.M. 1984 (Columbia University);
M. lur. 1985 (Trier, Germany). I wish to acknowledge the Honorable Edmund
B. Spaeth, Jr., Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz; Susanne Willgerodt, Esquire, Ger-
man attorney; and Professor Emeritus A. Leo Levin, University of Pennsylvania.
Each of these individuals read and commented on drafts of this article. The
viewpoints expressed, however, are solely those of the author. Thanks are also
due to Dr. Stefan Breitenstein, attorney-at-law in Zurich, Switzerland; the
National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia; the American Judi-
cature Society and the American Bar Association's Center for Professional Re-
sponsibility, both in Chicago, Illinois; and Lynn A. Marks, Executive Director of
Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, each of whom provided various materials.
The contents of this article have been updated through June 1991.
1. In most state courts and in the federal courts, judges' committees issue
advisory opinions in response to questions about ethics from individual judges.
In Pennsylvania, the Judicial Ethics Committee of the Pennsylvania Conference
of State Trial Judges issues such opinions upon request. Additionally, in the
federal system, the Judicial Conference Committee concerned with Ethical Stan-
dards in the Federal Judiciary answers requests from judges. See Review of the
Activities ofJudicial Conference Committees Concerned with Ethical Standards in the Federal
Judiciary, 73 F.R.D. 247 (1977). The American Bar Association's Center for Pro-
fessional Responsibility issues advisory opinions concerning the Judicial Code of
Conduct, a code which has been adopted by 48 jurisdictions.
As for judicial discipline, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have a
commission, board or committee that investigates allegations ofjudicial miscon-
duct. In many instances, but not in Pennsylvania, such groups also issue gui-
dance on ethical questions in advisory format. Summaries of cases and empirical
studies on the topic of judicial misconduct can be found in the JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT REPORTER, published quarterly by the American Judicature Society (AJS)
and in the JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY DIGEST, supplemented annually
by AJS. For literature on judicial discipline and in particular on judicial recusal,
see Abramson,Judicial Disqualification under Canon 3C of the Code ofJudicial Conduct
(1986) (monograph published by AJS concerning judicial disqualification);
Begue & Goldstein, How Judges Get Into Trouble, 26JUDGES'J. 8 (1987) (review of
judicial misconduct such as bias and appearance of partiality); Browning, Evalu-
ating Judicial Performance and Related Matters, 90 F.R.D. 197 (1981) (describing Ju-
dicial Council Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980);
(713)
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ciation (ABA) has completed its first comprehensive revision of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2 and a national commission has
been established to investigate the discipline and removal of fed-
eraljudges. 3 In Pennsylvania, the Governor's Commission onJu-
dicial Reform, known as the Beck Commission for its chair, the
Honorable Phyllis W. Beck of the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
has inspired a constitutional amendment that will establish an en-
tir.ely new system ofjudicial discipline in Pennsylvania if approved
by statewide referendum.4
Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining 'Good Behavior' for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1989) (urging judicial self-regulation in place of
legislating disciplinary standards for federal judges); Frank, Disqualification of
Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947) (focuses on judge's relationship to attorney as
cause for recusal and includes bibliography of articles on recusal from 1916-
1944); Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal ofJudges, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J.
599 (1986) (examination of Texas court decisions and ethics opinions); Lewis,
Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L.
REV. 381 (1990) (advocating due process to resolve pecuniary interest as well as
bias issues); Nevels, Bias and Interest: Should They Lead to Dissimilar Results inJudi-
cial Disqualification Practice? 27 ARMz. L. REV. 171 (1985) (discussing federal dis-
qualification cases under section 455 of Title 28 of United States Code); Thode,
The Code of Judicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
395; Symposium of Judicial Discipline and Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 633 (1987-88)
(entire issue concerns judicial removal, mostly under federal law); Note,Judicial
Disqualification: Alabama's Continuing Inconsistent Standard, 41 ALA. L. REV. 181
(1989) (criticizing Alabama courts for using actual bias as standard to disqualify
judges); Note, Disqualification ofJudges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 736 (1973) (arguing for appearance of impartiality, not actual bias, as gov-
erning standard for disqualification of federal judges); Note, Disqualification of
Judges for Preudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon
Experience, 48 OR. L. REV. 311 (1969) (mammoth compilation with lengthy bibli-
ography of older literature).
2. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (ABA House of Delegates 1990)
(hereinafter MODEL CODE). The Model Code amends the previous Code ofJudi-
cial Conduct in several minor ways: (a) adding personal bias or prejudice
against a party's attorney as grounds for judicial disqualification, MODEL CODE
Canon 3E(1)(a); (b) including de minimis interest as an exception to the provi-
sions requiring disqualification for interest, MODEL CODE Canon 3E(1)(c); and
(c) permitting the parties to remit or waive disqualification of the judges so long
as the basis for disqualifying her is not personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, MODEL CODE Canon 3F. The Model Code, with correlation tables to the
1972 Code of Judicial Conduct, is available from the ABA. For a discussion of
the Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 14-22
and accompanying text.
3. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 401-
418, 104 Stat, 5089, 5122 (1990) (the commission is to investigate issues in-
volved in tenure of federal judges, including their discipline and removal).
4. As required by the Pennsylvania Constitution in Article XI, both houses
of the General Assembly approved the proposed amendment in identical form in
two consecutive legislative sessions as ajoint resolution. H.B. 1, P.N. 166, 1991
Pa. General Assembly Sess. (signed by Speaker Feb. 12, 1991); S.B. 1, P.N.
2414, 1990 Pa. General Assembly Sess. (reported from committee June 29,
1990). In addition to the reform of the judicial disciplinary system, the pro-
[Vol. 36: p. 713
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/1
RECUSAL STANDARDS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Judicial removal is frequently in the news. In the last few
years Congress has impeached three federal judges,5 and the
criminal prosecution of some sixteen judges of the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas in the so-called Roofers' scandal6 has
brought unwanted notoriety to Philadelphia.
Public reaction nowadays seems to favor dismissal of any
judge who accepts gifts from potential litigants. This article sug-
gests that a less drastic sanction could be used, such as requiring
the return of any money accepted, public censure and removal
from any matter involving the giftgiver. For example, fifteen
years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reprimanded a judge
for taking the proceeds of a testimonial dinner and ordered him
to return the money, notwithstanding the custom for judges to
keep such proceeds. 7 Thejudge, however, was not removed from
office.
posed constitutional amendment mandated the same financial disclosure by
state judges as is required of state legislators and made the budget for statewide
courts and judicial agencies subject to approval and appropriation by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
The Commonwealth was enjoined by preliminary injunction on April 1,
1991 from placing the amendment on the ballot for the May 21, 1991 primary
election. Kramer v. Lewis, No. 72, Misc. Dkt. 1991 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Apr. 1,
1991). President Judge David W. Craig held that the Commonwealth had not
sought timely publication of the amendment in newspapers in each county as set
forth in Article XI of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. slip op. at 22-27. The
court also held that the amendment improperly delegated discretion to the
Commonwealth's Secretary of State to decide on which election to place the
amendment before the voters. Id. slip op. at 17-21. By setting oral argument on
the appeal for September 1, 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made it
unlikely that the amendment will be on the ballot in the November 1991 general
election even if Judge Craig's preliminary injunction is reversed or vacated.
Despite the clear legislative support behind the amendment, judicial oppo-
sition may make its future somewhat unpredictable. It is too soon to foretell
whether, how and when the voters in Pennsylvania will be presented with a pro-
posal to alter the judicial disciplinary system discussed in this article. For a dis-
cussion of the possible effect of this constittional amendment on recusal
decisions in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
5. Judges Harry Claiborne of Nevada (1986), Alcee Hastings of Florida
(1989) and Walter Nixon of Mississippi (1989) were impeached after trial in the
United States Senate. Judge Robert Aguilar of California, convicted of obstruc-
tion of justice in 1990, faces likely impeachment if the verdict is upheld on ap-
peal, as does Judge Robert Collins of Louisiana, convicted of bribery on June 29,
1991.
6. See In re Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473, appeal dismissed sub. nom
White v.Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 488 U.S. 805 (1988) (judges' acceptance
of cash gifts warranted varying sanctions of suspension, removal and forfeiture
of judicial office). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 152-55 and ac-
companying text.
7. In re Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975) (judge who took
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This article does not address the effect of sanctions on judi-
cial behavior, but does argue that at least some unacceptable judi-
cial conduct in Pennsylvania is better prevented through a neutral
application of the doctrine of judicial recusal than by the drastic
wrench of removal from office. In reaching this conclusion, the
procedures and standards for recusal of Pennsylvania judges are
reviewed" and compared with those in other state courts, 9 the
federal courts' ° and with the laws in two foreign countries, Swit-
zerland and Germany." I
Before 1972, recusal rules in Pennsylvania and elsewhere
were generally set by statute or general court rule. The introduc-
tion of a judicial conduct code shifted the legal analysis from ap-
plying general legal norms to judging moral behavior of judges.
Conflicts of interest and discipline became the prevailing con-
cerns rather than common sense and statutory interpretation.
Two changes in judicial recusal standards for Pennsylvania
are suggested by a look at the laws of other jurisdictions: first,
whenever feasible, a judge other than the one whose recusal is
sought ought to decide a recusal petition; and second, the appro-
priate standard for recusal is the appearance of prejudice or impro-
priety, not whether the judge is actually biased or has abused his
discretion in declining to recuse himself. Recusal should be re-
quired whenever a judge's impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned. In cases where the challenged judge is willing to grant the
recusal motion, referral should not be necessary. Otherwise, the
decisionmaker should not be the judge whose recusal is sought.
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct does not suggest that the
decision to recuse should be referred to another judge, doing so
may help reinstill or maintain the confidence of litigants and the
public's perception that state judges are impartial.' 2
8. For a discussion of the procedures and standards for judicial recusal in
Pennsylvania, see infra notes 13-171 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the procedures and standards for judicial disciplinary
action in other states, see infra notes 272-99 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of federal procedures and standards for judicial disci-
pline, see infra notes 186-271 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the Swiss and German procedures and standards for
judicial discipline, see infra notes 300-61 and accompanying text.
12. Professor Thode, the reporter for the Code, once suggested that if a
judge is unwilling to disqualify himself, the motion should be decided by other
members of the court. See Thode, supra note 1, at 410-11. The ABA's Standards
Relating to Trial Courts partially shares this view, stating that "a judge against
whom a motion to disqualify... is made may ... determine whether it is legally
sufficient on its face, but factual issues raised by the motion should be heard and
resolved by another judge." STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.32(a)
716 [Vol. 36: p. 713
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This author suggests, therefore, that while referring recusal
motions to "fellow judges" will offer its own opportunities for
abuse, it will provide needed peer review and will reinforce
judges' sense of institutional loyalty and commitment. Discipline
should be reserved for cases of extreme misbehavior by judges,
not for matters where the decision depends on the appearance of
impropriety. If these practices are incorporated into Penn-
sylvania law, by statute or case law, the opportunity for Penn-
sylvania judges to act corruptly in deciding cases will be
substantially reduced.
II. RECUSAL RULES IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Overview
Unlike the federal Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion incorporates the Code of Judicial Conduct' 3 and thus man-
dates judicial impartiality. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted recusal issues much more restrictively
than has the United States Supreme Court. Recusal standards for
Pennsylvania judges are found in Canon 3C of the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct. 14 Canon 3C(1) states broadly: "A judge should
(1987). This author does not suggest, however, that parties be allowed to make
a peremptory challenge to the selection of ajudge, unlike a procedure suggested
by the ABA's Trial Courts and permitted to a limited extent by at least three
states. Id. § 2.32(b) (proposes to give each party one peremptory challenge to
judge who has been assigned case); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (1987)
(parties can agree on substitute judge other than one assigned as of right within
20 days after service of summons in civil case or 10 days after service of order to
show cause, an information or other initiating document); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-
3-9 (1987) (authorizes each party to make one peremptory challenge to district
judge except in contempt actions); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West 1987) (per-
mits one substitution as of right within 60 days of start of proceedings).
13. Pennsylvania's Constitution states: "Justices and judges . . .shall not
violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court."
PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(b).
14. The amendments in the Model Code have not been adopted in Penn-
sylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Code of Judicial Con-
duct on November 21, 1973, with an effective date of January 1, 1974. In re
Adoption of CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, 455 Pa. xxix to xlix (1973). This arti-
cle cites the Code ofJudicial Conduct as adopted in Pennsylvania. Before 1974,
a number of state statutes set forth circumstances requiring, or in some cases
permitting, recusal. For a discussion of those state statutes, see infra notes 21,
66 and accompanying text.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, approved by the ABA on August 16, 1972,
was a complete overhaul of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which the ABA had
approved in 1924. Four canons from the 1924 Canons ofJudicial Ethics-num-
bers 4, 5, 13 and 29-are the precursors of Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Canon 4 stated: "A judge's official conduct should be free from im-
propriety and the appearance of impropriety ...." CANONS OFJUDICIAL ETHICS
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disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned .. ..",15 It then gives examples of dis-
qualifying conduct, such as where the judge "has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."' 6
(1924), reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 328 (1953). Canon 5 provided
that a judge should be "temperate, attentive, patient, impartial .... studious of
the principles of the law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts." Id.
Canon 13 dealt with kinship and influence:
[A judge should] not act in a controversy where a near relative is a
party; he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any
person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that
he is affected by the kinship, rank, position or influence of any party or
other person.
Id. at 330. Canon 29 stated that a judge "should abstain from performing or
taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved." Id. at
334.
15. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l), reported in 455 Pa. xxix,
xxxv (1973). In contrast, the analogous section of the ABA Model Code uses
the term "shall" instead of "should" as it does in many other sections through-
out the Code. See MODEL CODE Canon 3E(I). Notwithstanding the strengthen-
ing of the language, the Preamble of the ABA Model Code cautions that it "is
not intended ... that every transgression [of the Code] will result in disciplinary
action." Id. at 4.
16. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(a) (1974). While Canon
3C (1)(a) refers only to disqualification, the cases refer interchangeably to recusal
or disqualification. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821(1986); Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194,
200-01, 489 A.2d 1286, 1289 (1983). For a discussion of Aetna, see infra notes
248-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Municipal Publications, see
infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. But cf Kilgarlin & Bruch, supra note 1,
at 601-02 (defining disqualification as statutory, mandatory grounds and recusal
as discretionary decision on factors not set forth in rule or statute). For a discus-
sion of the German law distinction between mandatory grounds for exclusion
for interest (AusscHLUs) and discretionary rejection of a judge for bias
(ABLEHNUNG), see infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
The Code suggests disqualification where the judge has a personal or finan-
cial interest. These interests include situations where the judge served as lawyer
or material witness in the matter in controversy or where the judge knows that
he, his "spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a substantial finan-
cial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding,
or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding." PA. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT 3C(1)(b), 3C(1)(c).
In addition, the Code provides for judicial disqualification in the following
situations which involve some sort of personal relationship to the party or
proceeding:
[Where the judge,] his spouse or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such person
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; [or]
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding.
6
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Other canons not directly referring to recusal also provide a
measure of what is expected from ajudge. Canon 2 provides: "A
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety in all of his activities."' 17 Canon 3 says: "A judge should per-
form the duties of his office impartially and diligently."' 18
In addition to the incorporation of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct, the Commonwealth's Constitution establishes a Judicial In-
quiry and Review Board (JIRB) to investigate violations of the
Code and to make recommendations to the state's supreme court
as to the discipline or removal of judges. 19 The supreme court
selects five members of the Board; the Governor selects the re-
maining four members.20 The Board has become a repository for
complaints about a judge's failure to recuse himself.
Neither the constitution nor the statutory law of the Com-
monwealth grant any board or court exclusive jurisdiction over
recusal issues. The Code of Judicial Conduct replaced Penn-
sylvania recusal statutes, some over one hundred years old.2 '
The current applicable Pennsylvania statute simply repeats the
constitutional obligations of state judges that "[]udges .. .shall
not ... violate any canon of ethics prescribed by general rule." 22
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions before 1985
followed the Code of Judicial Conduct by examining recusal de-
terminations for the appearance of impropriety. 23 Like the
United States Supreme Court, the Commonwealth's supreme
court has also used due process to review recusal determinations,
but when doing so made actual prejudice its guide as opposed to
the appearance of partiality or bias.
PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(d)(i)-(iv).
17. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.
18. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.
19. PA. CONST. art V, §§ 18(a), (e), (g).
20. Id. § 18(a).
21. A law passed in 1816 instructed the president judge of any judicial dis-
trict not to hear any case in which he had been counsel or had a personal inter-
est, but to forward it to the president judge of the next nearest judicial district.
1816 PA. LAws 347. Another law, passed in 1825, provided for a special court of
common pleas to decide cases brought by or against a "near relative" of the
president judge of any judicial district. 1825 PA. LAWS 218. For a discussion of
statutes which enabled or required judges to certify cases to other judges, see
infra note 66.
22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302 (Purdon 1981).
23. The "appearance of impropriety" is the standard used by most courts
outside of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Kilgarlin & Bruch, supra note
1, at 642-48. For a discussion of the standards used outside Pennsylvania, see
infra notes 182-299 and accompanying text.
1991] 719
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Since 1985, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has maintained
that only the supreme court may review a judge's determination
of a recusal request, and the court will take action only after the
JIRB has issued a recommendation to remove the judge from of-
fice.2 4 At the same time, the court has nevertheless permitted re-
view of the recusal determination in the case-in-chief where actual
prejudice, a very difficult standard to satisfy, is shown to have al-
tered the result at trial.2 5
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, meanwhile, has continued
steadfastly to review recusal determinations by trial judges; some
panels requiring a showing of actual prejudice for reversal, others
using the appearance of impropriety test in silent rejection of the
supreme court's recent jurisprudence. 26
B. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The meaning of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Penn-
sylvania depends, of course, on its interpretation by the state's
highest court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The present
recusal rules were developed in Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court
of Common Pleas27 and the companion case of Reilly v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.2 8 These cases required actual
bias to be shown in order to warrant recusal, a stricter standard
than found in every other jurisdiction examined in this article. As
a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct in these two cases, review of recusal
determinations has been relegated primarily to the judicial disci-
plinary process.
1. Who Decides: The Municipal Publications Case
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in the Municipal Pub-
lications case that a recusal motion must be transferred to another
24. The Supreme Court, by thus increasing its control over judicial behav-
ior, perhaps unwittingly contributed to the Beck Commission's proposals to
change the judicial disciplinary system.
25. For a discussion of Pennsylvania cases dealing with allegedly outra-
geous conduct by a trial judge, see infra notes 79-100 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of recent Pennsylvania Superior Court cases dealing
with recusal standards, see infra notes 101-41 and accompanying text.
27. 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985) (judge must disqualify himself from
deciding recusal motion where he has personal knowledge of disputed facts and
permits himself to be witness in recusal hearing).
28. 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985) (superior court's reliance on Canon
3 to resolve recusal issue is improper because supreme court has exclusive right
to supervise conduct of state judges).
720 [Vol. 36: p. 713
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/1
RECUSAL STANDARDS IN PENNSYLVANIA
judge only if the judge whose recusal is sought decides to testify
on the matter.29 The superior court had issued a writ prohibiting
the trial judge from deciding the motion to recuse.30 The judge
was later removed from office in part for his behavior in the Mu-
nicipal Publications case. 3' In addition, a civil damages suit was
filed against both the judge and plaintiff's counsel for their al-
leged actions in that case.32
Municipal Publications began as a libel suit against the pub-
lisher of Philadelphia Magazine."3 Trial was before Judge Ber-
nard Snyder, sitting without a jury.3 4 After trial, but before the
judge had rendered a decision, the defendants filed a motion
seeking Judge Snyder's recusal.3 5 An affidavit of Herbert Lipson,
one of the defendants, was attached to the motion.36 Mr. Lipson,
in his affidavit, stated that he had heard from a trial lawyer not
involved in the case that plaintiff's counsel "was going to get a
hugh [sic] award" from the trial judge, that the case was "fixed,"
that "plaintiff's counsel had 'told a number of attorneys that he
was raising money for and supporting' the trial judge's campaign
to be elected" to the state supreme court, and that the judge "had
recently been a guest of plaintiff's counsel on a chartered bus
trip." 3 '
Although Judge Snyder initially directed the recusal motion
back to the motions court for reassignment, he later vacated that
order after the president judge, the court administrator and the
supreme court had each rejected the defendants' requests to as-
sign the motion to a judge from outside Philadelphia.38
Judge Snyder rejected Municipal Publication's offer to prove,
by testimony of his former law clerk, that the judge had partici-
pated in ex parte communications with plaintiff's counsel during
29. Municipal Publications, 507 Pa. at 202, 489 A.2d at 1290.
30. Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Snyder, 322 Pa. Super. 464, 468, 469
A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983), vacated sub nom. Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of
Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985).
31. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987).
32. Lipson v. Snyder, 701 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (court denied mo-
tion to dismiss made by one defendant, plaintiff's counsel; proceedings against
other defendant, judge, stayed due to his filing bankruptcy petition).




37. Id. at 481, 469 A.2d at 1093.
38. Id. at 478, 469 A.2d at 1091.
1991]
9
Kilimnik: Recusal Standards for Judges in Pennsylvania: Cause for Concern
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the trial.3 9 After hearing testimony on the motion to recuse,
Judge Snyder awarded the plaintiff $7 million, $5 million of which
were in punitive damages. 40
Judge Snyder's former law clerk was willing to testify to the
following allegations: the judge and plaintiff's counsel often met
in the judge's chambers and outer office during the trial with no
one present to represent the defendants; the judge and plaintiff's
counsel discussed evidentiary questions, trial tactics, and the
character of witnesses; the judge discussed with plaintiff's counsel
issues that the law clerk was researching; plaintiff's counsel had
helped the judge write a speech for his candidacy to the supreme
court; the judge commented that defendants' counsel "would not
be able to get rid of the verdict;" the judge told the law clerk that
the motion to recuse would cost defendants another $3 million in
punitive damages; and plaintiff's counsel and the judge discussed
the recusal motion after defendants' counsel had left the judge's
chambers. 4 1
Before Judge Snyder ruled on the motion to recuse, the su-
perior court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the law
clerk's allegations required another judge to resolve the mo-
tion.42 On appeal, the supreme court vacated the superior court's
order for lack ofjurisdiction, but agreed with the superior court's
action, stating:
[W]here, as here, a judge concludes that the allegations
justify an evidentiary hearing in which he will testify, it
then becomes incumbent upon that judge to step aside
for the appointment of another judge to hear and rule
upon the issue of disqualification. 43
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Nix and joined by all
four of the other participating justices, the court remanded the
recusal motion to another judge. This action, according to the
court, was warranted by the "extraordinary circumstances" in
which thejudge had "permitted himself to be called as a witness,"
gave testimony concerning his own conduct, and put himself in a
position to "rule on objections to his own testimony and to assess
his own credibility in light of conflicting evidence." 44 In reaching
39. Id. at 479, 469 A.2d at 1091.
40. Id. at 478-79, 469 A.2d at 1091.
41. Id. at 481-82, 469 A.2d at 1093.
42. Id. at 494, 469 A.2d at 1099.
43. Municipal Publications, 507 Pa. 194, 202, 489 A.2d 1286, 1290 (1985).
44. Id. at 201. 489 A.2d at 1289.
722 [Vol. 36: p. 713
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this conclusion, the court did not need to delineate a recusal stan-
dard, but had only to rely on longstanding evidentiary rules to
reach the same conclusion.45 By instead setting the referral
threshold so high, the court ensured that the judges whose
recusal is sought will decide most recusal motions.
2. The Standards of Review: The Reilly Case
Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority46 in-
volved a personal injury claim against the regional mass transit
agency. The recusal issues raised for the first time after trial con-
cerned alleged relationships between Judge Kremer, the trial
judge and the plaintiff's trial attorney. 47 Plaintiff's counsel had
once represented all of the Commonwealth's justices and judges,
including Judge Kremer, in a class action which sought increased
compensation for the judiciary. 48 In addition, Judge Kremer's
son-in-law and step-nephew were affiliated with the law firm of
plaintiff's counsel.49
The superior court had remanded the recusal issues to a dif-
ferent judge, ordering him to decide the following: (1) whether
Judge Kremer's son-in-law had an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the case; and (2) whether the
judge's relationship with a step-nephew who had appeared briefly
in the case and was employed by plaintiff's counsel warranted
recusal. 50 The superior court held that, while no one of these
contacts required recusal, the hearing judge should inquire
whether the relationship between Judge Kremer and his step-
nephew was so intimate and of such duration and the step-
nephew's participation in the case so extensive that the judge's
45. See FEDERAL AND UNIFORM REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE 605 (1988)
("the judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No
objection need be made to preserve the point."); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 68, at 164 (3d ed. 1984) ("When a judge is called as witness in a trial before
him, his role as witness is manifestly inconsistent with his customary role of im-
partiality .... ").
46. 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985).
47. Id. at 214, 489 A.2d at 1297. A motion to recuse the trial judge for
alleged personal bias against trial counsel for South Eastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority (SEPTA) was made orally at the pretrial conference and by
written motion during jury selection. Id. at 213-14, 489 A.2d at 1296-97. The
trial judge denied this motion. Id.
48. Id. at 214, 489 A.2d at 1297.
49. Id.
50. Reilly v. SEPTA, 330 Pa. Super. 420, 464-65, 479 A.2d 973, 995-96
(1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985) (supreme
court reversed superior court's remand for evidentiary hearing on recusal issue).
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 5'
The supreme court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Papadakos and joined by four justices, reversed an en banc Supe-
rior Court on the recusal issue.5 2 The court held that the enforce-
ment of the Code of Judicial Conduct is the exclusive province of
the supreme court and that the superior court may neither inter-
pret Canon 3C nor create standards for reviewing recusal deci-
sions. 53 Under the Reilly standard, therefore, only the supreme
court and the judge whose recusal is sought may apply the Code
of Judicial Conduct to resolve a recusal motion.
Because the supreme court can review only a small number
of cases, the Reilly decision leaves the task of applying standards
of conduct to the very individuals who are accused of violating
those standards. The result is easy to predict: relatively few
recusal motions are granted and attorneys avoid raising such mo-
tions in the first place, having no wish to antagonize the presiding
judge and knowing that the recusal decision essentially rests with
the judge alone. 54
Under Reilly, if a judge errs in denying a recusal motion, that
denial can be evaluated in a disciplinary proceeding. Only rarely,
however, will that denial be considered on an appeal of the case.
As Justice Papadakos wrote for the Court:
Upon the Judicial Inquiry and Review] Board's
findings and determinations recommending disciplinary
action for violations of the Code, the matter is referred
to this body. We then review the record and may wholly
accept or reject the recommendation as we find just and
proper. . . . This procedure, except for impeachment
proceedings, is the exclusive mode established for the
discipline of our judges for violations of the Code and
we have not abdicated or delegated any of our supervi-
sory authority in enforcing these standards of conduct to
Superior Court. To presume that the Code or its alleged
violations can be reviewed by any tribunal other than
51. Id. at 444, 479 A.2d at 985 (citing PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Ca-
non 3C(l)).
52. Reilly v. SEPTA, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985).
53. Id. at 218-20, 489 A.2d at 1298-99.
54. At the 1990 Annual Bench-Bar Conference of the Philadelphia Bar As-
sociation, a "buffer committee" was created to informally approach judges about
complaints from lawyers which would otherwise go unreported because of fear
of recrimination. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 20, 1990, at 1; see also Sarvey, On the
Chopping Block: The Dilemma of Turning in a Judge, PA. LAw. 13 (Nov. 1990).
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those we authorize is a misapprehension of the purpose
of the Code, and is seen as an impermissible meddling
into the administrative and supervisory functions of this
Court over the entire [state] judiciary.55
The Reilly court held that a trial judge's decision not to re-
cuse herself is reviewable in the case-in-chief for abuse of discre-
tion.56 Because the recusal motion in Reilly was made for the first
time on appeal, the court applied standards used in the appeal of
cases involving after-discovered evidence: that the evidence was
not discoverable at trial by use of due diligence, and a "but for"
test-the newly discovered evidence "would have compelled a
different result" at trial. 57 Since the complaining defendant,
SEPTA, could not prove either of these additional factors, the
court upheld the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself without
defining abuse of discretion in the context of recusal decisions. 58
Reilly, therefore, also provides that, however narrow the abuse of
discretion standard might be, it does permit judicial review of a
recusal decision in the case-in-chief. This review, however, can
only occur after the conclusion of the trial proceedings.
3. The Shaky Foundations of the Reilly Holding
In emphasizing the disciplinary process in Reilly, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court relied extensively on In re Crawford's Es-
tate, 59 a case then almost fifty years old. The facts in Crawford's
Estate were peculiarly unsuited to support a broad holding on
recusal procedures.
The trial judge in Crawford's Estate had in fact referred the
motion to recuse to a judge from another county. 60 It was dic-
tum, therefore, when the Crawford's Estate court said that a trial
judge is ordinarily not required to refer a motion to recuse to
another judge. 6' The supreme court agreed that no direct evi-
dence of prejudice was shown.62 The lawyer filing the recusal re-
quest had successfully defended a will against challenge and had
filed a request for payment of fees. 63 The lawyer alleged that the
55. Reilly, 507 Pa. at 220, 489 A.2d at 1299.
56. Id. at 224, 489 A.2d at 1301.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 225, 489 A.2d at 1302.
59. 307 Pa. 102, 160 A. 585 (1931).
60. Id. at 105, 160 A. at 586.
61. Id. at 108-09, 160 A. at 587.
62. Id. at 109-10, 160 A. at 587.
63. Id. at 110, 160 A. at 587-88.
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trial judge was prejudiced against him personally.r4 While the
supreme court denied the recusal motion, it also reversed the trial
judge on the merits and directed the trial court to award the full
amount of fees sought by counsel.65 In result, the lawyer who
sought recusal got what he wanted even though he lost the mo-
tion to recuse.
The relevance of Crawford's Estate as support for Reilly is fur-
ther in doubt because, unlike Reilly, Crawford's Estate interpreted
statutes since repealed which in specific circumstances permitted
a judge to refer a recusal motion to another judge.66 Thus, the
issue in Crawford's Estate was more one of statutory interpretation
than of policy.
The Crawford's Estate court interpreted a statute from 1917
that permitted a judge of a court of common pleas, in a judicial
district having no orphans' court, to call upon any judge to pre-
side in a matter arising under the court's orphan court jurisdic-
tion "by reason of sickness, absence, interest or other cause." 67
The Reilly court used Crawford's Estate as precedent when neither
the facts nor the laws then controlling were similar. Since 1974,
the Code of Judicial Conduct had provided the sole non-case de-
rived principles in Pennsylvania governing judicial recusal, yet the
Reilly court ignored the Code's provisions that admonish judges
to avoid the appearances of impropriety and to recuse themselves
whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
64. Id. at 105, 160 A. at 586.
65. Id. at 111-13, 160 A. at 588-89.
66. No fewer than seven different statutes then enabled or required judges
to certify cases to otherjudges. See 1834 PA. LAWS 531, 539 (repealed in 1978)
(special courts to be formed where president judge of county court of common
pleas: (1) was "personally interested in the event of any cause"; (2) owned claim
under which parties sued; (3) had near relative who was party to case or inter-
ested in its outcome; or (4) was counsel for either of parties in same suit or in
any related matter); 1840 PA. LAws 153 (repealed in 1978) (special court must
not itself be incompetent if same cause was before his own court); 1856 PA. LAWS
500 (repealed in 1978) (when president judge is party in action, action "shall be
tried and heard before president judge residing nearest place of trial who shall
be disinterested"); 1860 PA. LAWS 552 (repealed in 1978) (in case of sickness or
inability of judge to hold regular court session, any other judge in Common-
wealth may be called in); 1861 PA. LAws 494 (supplemented 1860 PA. LAWS 552)
(repealed in 1978) (in all cases which judge is prohibited from trying, any other
judge in Commonwealth may be called in); 1875 PA. LAWS 35 (repealed in 1978)
(allowing party to file petition for change of venue where president judge has
interest in outcome of case); 1917 PA. LAws 363, 368 (repealed in 1977) (judge
unable to sit in matter involving orphans' court jurisdiction by reason of sick-
ness, absence, interest or other cause, may call upon any other judge to preside
over case).
67. 307 Pa. at 107, 160 A. at 587 (quoting 1917 PA. LAws 363, 368).
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Moreover, Reilly ignored precedent of more recent vintage than
Crawford's Estate.
In Commonwealth v. Darush,68 a 1983 case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had affirmed a jury verdict and the trial court's
denial of a motion for disqualification but nonetheless remanded
the case for sentencing before another judge. A jury in Potter
County had convicted William Darush of burglary, theft, receiving
stolen property and conspiracy. 69 Darush argued thatJudge Fink,
the trial judge, should recuse himself for four reasons: (1) Judge
Fink was district attorney at the time Darush's offenses were com-
mitted; (2) while he was district attorney, he took a statement
from the Commonwealth's primary witness in regard to an unre-
lated event; (3) while he was district attorney, he had prosecuted
Darush on unrelated charges; and (4) he had made derogatory
remarks about Darush and had overheard Darush make deroga-
tory remarks about him during his election campaign. 70
The Darush court stated that a judge must recuse himself
whenever "he believes his impartiality can be reasonably questioned," yet
the court looked to the record for an actual showing of the judge's
prejudgment or bias which affected the jury.71 Finding none, the
court refused to order a new trial, but did vacate the defendant's
sentence and order resentencing before a different trial judge as
"It]he largely unfettered sentencing discretion afforded ajudge is
better exercised by one without hint of animosity toward
appellant.'"72
In a 1982 case, the murder verdict against a former United
Mineworkers Union president, Tony Boyle, for murdering his
predecessor, was appealed. 73 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself from presiding
over Boyle's trial.74 The court, in an opinion by Justice Nix, ex-
amined the record with care for instances of the judicial bias al-
leged by Boyle. The fact that the presiding judge had
participated in an earlier stage of the proceeding-the first trial-
was not grounds for recusal. 75 Nor was the fact that the presiding
68. 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983).
69. Id. at 19, 459 A.2d at 729-30.
70. Id. at 20-21, 459 A.2d at 729-30.
71. Id. at 21, 459 A.2d at 731 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454
Pa. 358, 361, 311 A.2d 652, 654 (1973) (emphasis in original)).
72. Id. at 24, 459 A.2d at 732.
73. Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447 A.2d 250 (1982).
74. Id. at 499, 447 A.2d at 257.
75. Id. at 490, 447 A.2d at 252.
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judge's rulings in the former trial were similar to his rulings in the
retrial sufficient grounds for recusal. In short, the Boyle court
found no specific incident with which to question the trial judge's
objectivity. 76
In rejecting the request to reverse on the ground of judicial
bias in Boyle, unlike the Reilly court, Justice Nix used no con-
clusory language regarding the proper standard of review of
recusal requests. Rather, he affirmatively stated the general prin-
ciple that "[r]ecusal is required whenever there is substantial
doubt as to a jurist's ability to preside impartially. " 77 In dictum,
Justice Nix pointed to circumstances that would have provided for
recusal: (1) whenever ajudge "has doubts as to his ability to pre-
side objectively and fairly ...or where ...factors or circum-
stances [exist] that may reasonably question [his] impartiality";
(2) when there is "exposure of ajudge in a pretrial proceeding to
highly prejudicial and inflammatory evidence" that would not be
admissible at the trial stage; or (3) when a judge receives "infor-
mation from an extrajudicial source that may have inspired a prej-
udice" against the defendant. 78
4. Constitutional Law
As a result of its undue emphasis on the disciplinary process
for handling recusal complaints, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has come to rely on constitutional principles of due process of
law, not the recusal standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct,
when a trial judge's behavior is so outrageously biased as to re-
quire reversal of the judgment. Commonwealth v. Hammer,79 de-
cided three months after Municipal Publications and Reilly,
illustrates the court's use of a due process standard.
The defendant in Hammer was convicted of murder.8 0 On di-
rect appeal, Hammer alleged that the trial judge's manner of ex-
amining the witnesses advocated a point of view favoring the
prosecution and this undue participation by the judge adversely
76. Id.
77. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Knighton, 490 Pa. 16,
415 A.2d 9 (1980); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652 (1973); CODE OFJUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(a); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 6-1.7
(2d ed. 1980).
78. 498 Pa. at 490-91 nn.4-6, 447 A.2d at 252 nn.4-6 (citations omitted).
79. 508 Pa. 88, 494 A.2d 1054 (1985).
80. Id. at 95, 494 A.2d at 1056. Hammer was sentenced to a term of impris-
onment of seven and one-half years to fifteen years on March 9, 1980. Id. at 95,
494 A.2d at 1058. Notice of appeal was filed April 18, 1980. Id.
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and prejudicially contributed to the verdict, amounting to a de-
nial of due process. 81
Under the standard used by the court just three months
before in Reilly,8 2 Hammer's appeal should have been dismissed
because the reasons for a recusal motion were evident at trial.83
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, since Commonwealth
v. Goodman,84 had applied a waiver doctrine in judicial recusal
matters which precluded review of a disqualification motion
where the grounds for the motion were raised for the first time on
appeal. The Hammer court, however, suspended the waiver rule
and reviewed the trial record more carefully than had been done
in either Municipal Publications or Reilly.85 "Trial judge participa-
tion in the examination of the testifying defendant," wrote Justice
Flaherty in a 5 to 2 decision, "is acutely objectionable where there
is any suggestion that the judge has an opinion regarding the
credibility of the defendant or the plausibility of the events re-
lated by the defendant." 86 According to the court, the aggregate
of improprieties by the judge compelled the conclusion that due
process had been denied.8 7 Thus, the court, in effect, adopted an
appearance of impropriety test under the guise of due process.
Yet, the Hammer court, in addressing allegations ofjudicial impro-
priety, made no reference to the Code of Judicial Conduct other
than to excuse the failure of Hammer's counsel to object to the
judge's questioning and to seek recusal at trial. 88
The due process standard used in Hammer by the Penn-
81. Id.
82. Reilly v. SEPTA, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985).
83. In Reilly, the court did not review allegations that relatives of the trial
judge were employed by the law firm of plaintiff's counsel, not only because of
the new interpretation of the Code ofJudicial Conduct as applying only in disci-
plinary cases, but also because SEPTA did not make these allegations at trial. Id.
at 221-22, 489 A.2d at 1300. SEPTA failed to show that the information on
which the allegations were based was unavailable to it at trial in the exercise of
due diligence, and that the allegations, if raised, would have compelled a differ-
ent result. Id. at 224, 489 A.2d at 1301. For a discussion of the Reilly holding,
see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
84. 454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652 (1973) (no review of disqualification motion
after prosecution for marijuana possession where grounds for disqualification
raised for first time on appeal).
85. Hammer, 508 Pa. at 99, 494 A.2d at 1060. The court stated: "We ...
question the continued validity of the waiver doctrine as applied to improprie-
ties of the trial judge for when the position of power and authority enjoyed by
the judge is considered, the strict enforcement of the waiver doctrine becomes
inadvisable." Id. at 96-97, 494 A.2d at 1058.
86. Id. at 101, 494 A.2d at 1061.
87. Id. at 108, 494 A.2d at 1064.
88. Id. at 95, 494 A.2d at 1058.
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sylvania Supreme Court requires actual judicial bias so strong
that it is deemed to inordinately influence the outcome of the
trial. 89 Few litigants have been able to pass this test and get a new
trial. For example, in Commonwealth v. O'Shea,90 the court declined
to reverse the trial judge's action on a recusal motion in a death
penalty murder case. The case was directly appealable to the
supreme court because the death penalty was imposed.9' The
O'Shea court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
when he stated gratuitously at O'Shea's sentencing hearing that,
although he was district attorney when O'Shea had been prose-
cuted for an unrelated robbery, he had not known of any deals or
agreements made affecting O'Shea.92
In Goodheart v. Casey,93 however, the supreme court granted
reargument because of a claim that two justices had improperly
participated in deciding a matter by which they would have been
personally affected. The case involved the construction of a state
statute that eliminated certain options for judges' retirement con-
tributions and increased contribution rates for judges entering
service after March 1, 1974. 94 This statute affected the retirement
options of the two justices. 95
The Goodheart court attempted to distinguish Aetna Life Insur-
ance Company v. Lavoie,96 in which the United States Supreme
Court, subsequent to Reilly and Municipal Publications, held im-
proper an Alabama justice's participation in an insurance tort
case where the justice was involved in similar insurance litigation
himself and the decision clearly benefited his own case. ChiefJus-
tice Nix wrote without dissent on the issue of recusal: Aetna re-
quired "an objective standard as to whether the 'interest' would
lead the average judge... 'not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true.' "97 Seizing dictum in Aetna that the interested justice there
89. Id. at 101, 494 A.2d at 1061 ("[W]here the judge oversteps the bounds
of propriety in examining witnesses, by exhibiting opinion, bias or prejudice, the
jury must be deemed to be inordinately impressed by this evidence of the
judge's opinion such that the defendant is deprived of a fair and impartial trial
....1').
90. 523 Pa. 384, 567 A.2d 1023 (1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 225 (1990).
91. Id. at 389, 567 A.2d at 1025.
92. Id. at 406-09, 567 A.2d at 1034-35.
93. 523 Pa. 188, 565 A.2d 757 (1989).
94. Id. at 190 n.1, 565 A.2d at 758 n.l.
95. Id. at 195-97, 565 A.2d at 760-61.
96. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
97. Goodheart, 523 Pa. at 196-97, 565 A.2d at 761 (quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)).
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had played a leading role in the 5-4 decision reached by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court, Chief Justice Nix wrote that the participa-
tion of the two admittedly personally interested justices in this
case was "mere surplusage" because the decision was 6-1.98
Disregarding the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Aetna, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that whether ajustice
has a personal bias or interest is an "unreviewable" decision, and
that whether the justice's participation would give the appearance
of impropriety is a decision "of lesser importance because ap-
pearances are notjustice."99 According to the Goodheart court, if a
judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, "that is a matter for
this Court to address under [its disciplinary] powers."' 00
C. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
Until Municipal Publications and Reilly, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court had required referral of a recusal motion whenever the
allegations provided a sufficient basis on which the trial judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' 0 ' The court also
required judges to recuse themselves whenever the appearance of
partiality existed, especially in the sentencing phase of criminal
trials. 102
For example, in Commonwealth v. Bryant,'0 3 the superior court
remanded proceedings for sentencing to a different judge where
98. Id. at 197-98, 565 A.2d at 761-62.
99. Id. at 201-02, 565 A.2d at 764. The scope of this decision may be lim-
ited to recusal petitions involving supreme court justices. Viewed in this way,
the "unreviewability" of the justice's decision whether to recuse himself is no
stricter than the United States Supreme Court's practice. United States
Supreme Court justices recuse themselves frequently without explanation. Good-
heart went farther by obliging the other members on the court to request a jus-
tice not to participate in a case. Id. at 202, 565 A.2d at 764.
100. Id. at 198, 565 A.2d at 762.
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrison, 228 Pa. Super. 412, 323 A.2d 72
(1972) (case remanded for new trial where judge, in colloquy with counsel, de-
manded apology from counsel for counsel's questioning the veracity of witness
who was police officer).
102. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryant, 328 Pa. Super. 1, 476 A.2d 422
(1984); Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 267 Pa. Super. 170, 406 A.2d 573 (1979).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
Of course, not every lapse ofjudicial temper during trial warrants recusal. The
superior court has recognized that judges must be free to intervene in the trial
to expedite the case, prevent unnecessary waste of time, or clear up some obscu-
rity. See Commonwealth v. McGuire, 339 Pa. Super. 320, 335, 488 A.2d 1144,
1152 (1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 A. 486 (1924))
(while judge may intervene to expedite trial, he must keep in mind that "undue
interference" may prejudice party's case).
103. 328 Pa. Super. 1, 476 A.2d 422 (1984).
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the trial judge was alleged to have said, in two other cases involv-
ing this defendant, that the defendant would get the maximum
sentence. The trial judge had also allegedly changed the date for
the sentencing hearing of the defendant in one of those earlier
cases in order to generate pre-election publicity for himself.' 4
An en banc court which included the trial judge from the case had
rejected the defendant's motion to recuse and the trial judge then
sentenced the defendant.' 0 5 The superior court ruled that the
trial judge should have recused himself from the post-verdict mo-
tions and sentencing because "[tihe precept governing judicial
conduct is the avoidance of not only actual impropriety but also
the appearance of impropriety."'10 6
In Commonwealth v. Schwartz,' 0 7 the superior court remanded
another criminal case for resentencing where the trial judge was
alleged to have said that he did not need a pre-sentence investiga-
tion because he had seen the defendant on television and would
rely on that program in sentencing the defendant. 0 8 The matter,
however, was not automatically remanded to another judge.
Rather, the superior court permitted the trial judge to decide
whether or not to have another judge sentence the defendant. 0 9
The court also directed the trial judge to "state on the record why
his impartiality could not reasonably be called into question" if he
had, in fact, seen a television program about the defendant." 0
Since the Reilly and Municipal Publications decisions, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court has cautiously continued to review
recusal decisions by trial judges for abuse of discretion.
In Commonwealth v. Lemanski, "' a case involving former Com-
mon Pleas Court Judge Fink, Superior Court President Judge Ci-
rillo held that the trial judge had abused his discretion by not
recusing himself from deciding a marijuana prosecution where
the record established that the trial judge had a "predetermined
policy with respect to sentencing drug offenders." ' " 2 While the
Commonwealth conceded that the recusal motion should have
104. Id. at 5-6, 476 A.2d at 424.
105. Id. at 6, 476 A.2d at 424.
106. Id. at 10, 476 A.2d at 426 (citations omitted).
107. 267 Pa. Super. 170, 406 A.2d 573 (1979).
108. Id. at 172, 406 A.2d at 574.
109. Id. at 173, 406 A.2d at 574. The court cited Canon 3C(l)(a) of the
Code ofJudicial Conduct as the appropriate standard to be applied by the trial
judge on remand. Id. at 172, 406 A.2d at 574.
110. Id.
111. 365 Pa. Super. 332, 529 A.2d 1085 (1987).
112. Id. at 341, 529 A.2d at 1089.
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been referred to another judge, President Judge Cirillo stretched
Municipal Publications to apply not only to where a trial judge actu-
ally testifies but also to "where the judge brings his credibility
into issue by having to admit or deny certain facts." 11 3
The superior court's decision in Lemanski was no doubt forti-
fied by the fact that Lemanski's counsel had already testified
before theJIRB regarding two incidents related to the proceeding
under appeal."l 4 Additionally, after argument was held, appellant
informed the court by a post-submission memorandum that
Judge Fink had been temporarily suspended from hearing cases
and had subpoenaed the appellant, the appellant's wife, and the
prosecuting attorney to testify at the JIRB proceedings." 15 These
facts, ruled the superior court, warranted remanding the case to a
different judge regardless of the outcome of the other issues in
the appeal." 16
Another superior court panel, in Commonwealth v. Satzberg,1 7
stated that Municipal Publications required a trial judge to transfer a
recusal motion "only when he has personal knowledge of the dis-
puted facts and has decided to testify at the recusal hearing."' 8
Because this judge did not testify, the superior court upheld his
action.' 19 To reach this conclusion, the appellate court reviewed
the record, but found nothing that "cast doubt on the trial judge's
impartiality or objectivity."' 2 0 The court also noted that the jury
verdict protected the integrity of the fact-finding process and that
the defendant had made the recusal motion only after the jury
verdict was rendered.12 1
Superior court decisions in the past few years have tended to
omit any reference to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moreover,
when the superior court uses abuse of discretion as a standard of
113. Id. at 339 n.2, 529 A.2d at 1088 n.2 (citing Municipal Publications, Inc.
v. Court of Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194, 201-02, 489 A.2d 1286, 1289 (1985)).
114. Id. at 359, 529 A.2d at 1098.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 358-59, 529 A.2d at 1097-98.
117. 358 Pa. Super. 39, 516 A.2d 758 (1986).
118. Id. at 44, 516 A.2d at 760 (citations omitted). According to the de-
fendant, the judge had spoken to him in a threatening manner during settlement
negotiations of a civil case arising from the same facts. Id. The judge allegedly
threatened the defendant in the civil case with seven years in prison if the de-
fendant did not resolve a matter in which he had removed a corporation's assets
and appropriated its accounts. Id. at 44 n.1, 516 A.2d at 760 n.l.
119. Id. at 44-45, 516 A.2d at 760.
120. Id. at 45, 516 A.2d at 761.
121. Id. at 45, 516 A.2d at 760-61. The case was remanded for a new trial
on other grounds. ld. at 45-47, 516 A.2d at 761-62.
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review, it means actual partiality or impropriety. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Patterson,122 a defendant in a murder case as-
serted that the trial judge should have recused himself because:
(1) the judge had been a prosecuting attorney when the case was
being investigated; (2) the prosecutor actively supported the
judge in his election campaign and was socially acquainted with
him; (3) the assistant prosecutor was a former law clerk of the trial
judge; and (4) the assistant prosecutor's mother was the judge's
bailiff.' 23 The court rejected these grounds, holding that there
was no evidence of any actual impropriety. 124 The judge had
stated that, although the case stemmed from the time of his em-
ployment in the district attorney's office, he lacked any knowledge
of this case.' 25 Consequently, the superior court found no abuse
of discretion after an "independent and thorough review of the
record."1 26
In Commonwealth v. Hewett,' 27 the superior court also required
the defendant to show that actual partiality affected the outcome
of the trial in order to reverse a conviction for a judge's refusal to
recuse himself. That the trial judge was the subject of an unre-
lated disciplinary investigation did not itself warrant recusal. 128
In re McFall, 129 an aberration in terms of superior court deci-
sions on recusal issues, illustrates another resort to due process
to resolve recusal issues that the Code of Judicial Conduct was
meant to resolve. In McFall, the Defenders Association of Phila-
delphia filed motions on behalf of twenty-nine criminal defend-
ants, seeking nullification of all judicial actions of Common Pleas
Court Judge Cunningham during the period that she acted as an
undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the
Roofers investigation.130 Judge Cunningham's actions were chal-
lenged as violative of the state constitution's separation of power
doctrine, the federal guarantee of due process, and Pennsylvania
case law on recusal.' 3 '
122. 392 Pa. Super. 331, 572 A.2d 1258 (1990).
123. Id. at 353-54, 572 A.2d at 1270.
124. Id. at 354, 572 A.2d at 1270.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 380 Pa. Super. 334, 551 A.2d 1080 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 583,
559 A.2d 526 (1989).
128. Id. at 340-44, 551 A.2d at 1083-85.
129. 383 Pa. Super. 356, 556 A.2d 1370 (1989), appeal granted, 578 A.2d
927 (Pa. 1990).
130. Id. at 360-61, 556 A.2d at 1372-73.
131. Id. at 361. 556 A.2d at 1373.
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At the time the motions were filed, Judge Cunningham had
been transferred to a different court division.' 32 The motions
were consolidated and assigned to another judge who granted
them.' 33 This judge ordered new proceedings for any defendant
whose case had been handled by Judge Cunningham during the
period she was a government informant; if the same result oc-
curred as at the original hearing, the case would be returned to its
current status. 3
4
Citing due process guarantees, its own precedents, 3 5 pre-
Reilly Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases,' 36 and federal deci-
sions,' 37 the superior court, in McFall, held that the "threat of
bias and appearance of impropriety was significant enough" to
warrant the relief entered by the trial judge to whom the recusal
motions had been assigned. 38 According to the McFall court, the
threat of bias and appearance of impropriety violated guarantees
of due process and judicial decisions on recusal, and therefore
warranted rehearings before another judge. 39
"The public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice
system," said the court, "will not be served by leaving un-
redressed the role of a judge in deciding key phases of criminal
prosecution while also working for prosecution authorities during
the same period of time."' 40 The McFall court held that the
threat of bias and appearance of impropriety, according to due
132. Id.
133. Id. at 361-62, 556 A.2d at 1373.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 363-64, 556 A.2d at 1373-75 (citing Commonwealth v. Berrigan,
369 Pa. Super. 145, 535 A.2d 91 (1987), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 609, 557 A.2d 341
(1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989) (resentencing ordered because appel-
late court concluded that impartiality of trial judge might reasonably be ques-
tioned); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 328 Pa. Super. 1, 476 A.2d 422 (1984);
Commonwealth ex rel. Armor v. Armor, 263 Pa. Super. 353, 398 A.2d 173 (1978)
(court found no proof of actual prejudice, but held that family support case in-
volving woman who had remarried county judge should not be heard by any of
judge's colleagues in county)).
136. Id. at 363-67, 556 A.2d at 1373-74 (citing Commonwealth v. Darush,
501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983); Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447
A.2d 250 (1982)).
137. Id. at 364-66, 556 A.2d at 1374-75 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lav-
oie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)).
138. Id. at 368, 556 A.2d at 1376. Judge Kelly dissented because the
court's decision conflicted with Reilly. Id. at 369, 556 A.2d at 1376-77 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id. at 368, 556 A.2d at 1376.
140. Id. The court failed to note that the "prosecution authorities" were
different: the cases before the judge were brought by the Commonwealth, but
the judge was informing for federal authorities.
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process guarantees and judicial decisions on recusal, warranted
rehearings of all of Judge Cunningham's judicial actions during
the time she acted as an undercover agent for the- government.' 4 1
But for the strained interpretation of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct in Municipal Publications and Reilly, it would not have been
necessary for the McFall court to reach for a holding relying on
constitutional guarantees of due process.
III. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND RECUSAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
The state constitution gives the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
general supervisory and administrative authority over all the
courts.' 4 2 The constitution also establishes the Judicial Inquiry
and Review Board as an institution to recommend suspension, re-
moval from office or other discipline of a judge for violating any
law or canon of legal or judicial ethics set by the supreme
court.' 43 Nowhere, however, does the constitution confer exclu-
sive power on the Board to redress violations of the Code ofJudi-
cial Conduct. One result of this constitutional split of power is
that judicial interpretation of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial
Conduct occurs today almost exclusively in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decisions reviewing disciplinary recommenda-
tions of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. Moreover, the
supreme court's decisions on recusal and disciplinary actions do
not appear to be entirely consistent.
There is an implicit tension between most of the recentjudi-
cial disciplinary cases and the recusal standards established in
Reilly. With the exception of two opinions written by Justice
Juanita Stout, 144 and a 3 to 2 split opinion authored by Justice
141. Id.
142. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
143. Id. §§ 18(d), (g).
144. See In re Sylvester, 521 Pa. 300, 555 A.2d 1202 (1989); In re Braig, 520
Pa. 409, 554 A.2d 493 (1989). The supreme court in these two cases rejected a
recommendation from theJIRB that two of the so-called "Roofers' judges" had
violated the Code ofJudicial Conduct and should be removed from office. 521
Pa. at 313-14, 555 A.2d at 1208; 520 Pa. at 426, 554 A.2d at 502. JusticeJuanita
Kid Stout, writing for the court in both instances, stressed theJIRB's burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence. 521 Pa. at 304, 313, 555 A.2d at 1203,
1208; 520 Pa. at 413, 526, 554 A.2d at 495, 502. Neither case involved any
allegations that the respondent judges should have recused themselves in any
matter; the focus was on gifts they had accepted from Stephen Traitz, Jr., the
business manager of Roofers' Union Local 30-30B. 521 Pa. at 302-04, 555 A.2d
at 1203; 520 Pa. at 411-13, 554 A.2d at 494-95. The only reference to recusal
was in Braig where court noted that Judge Braig had a policy of recusing himself
from cases involving members of the roofers union since 1981 because of a
longstanding family friendship with Traitz. 520 Pa. at 415, 554 A.2d at 496.
[Vol. 36: p. 713
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Papadakos,145 the judicial disciplinary standard is the appearance of
impropriety. The rule set by Reilly, however, is that recusal deci-
sions are directly reviewed only for actual impropriety that af-
fected the outcome of the trial. 146 Tension for the judges is
created by these two standards because a recusal determination
does not necessarily put the matter at rest. The same decisions
reviewed on a recusal motion can return to haunt the judge later
with vengeance in a disciplinary proceeding.
This result does not aid litigants in the main proceeding who
are deprived of an impartialjudge. In addition, it transfers undue
powers over judges to a board whose members are political ap-
pointees and it overemphasizes the state supreme court as the
disciplinarian of other judges. It is no wonder that lower court
judges feel their independence increasingly threatened and that
the press complains about inconsistent and partial administration
of justice in the Commonwealth's courts.
A. Application of Current Standards By The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court
In In re Glancey, 147 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved
the JIRB's recommendation to bar Judge Joseph Glancey from
holding judicial office. 148 The grounds for the decision were
Judge Glancey's acceptance of gifts from the Roofers' Union and
his later denial of having done so, in both official forms and inter-
views with law enforcement agents. 149
There were no allegations that Judge Glancey should have
recused himself in any particular matter. The court, however,
cited the commentary to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct: "[A] judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety."150 The court barred Judge Glancey from future ju-
145. In re Chiovero, 524 Pa. 181, 570 A.2d 57 (1990). For a discussion of
Chiovero, see infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of Reilly, see supra notes 46-58 and accompanying
text.
147. 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988).
148. Id. at 288, 542 A.2d at 1356. Judge Glancey resigned his position as
ChiefJudge of the Philadelphia Municipal Court while the disciplinary proceed-
ing was on appeal in the supreme court, and he consented to the entry of an
order declaring him ineligible for election to judicial office in the future. Id. at
282, 542 A.2d at 1353. Nevertheless, the supreme court found it necessary to
explain by written opinion why Judge Glancey should be barred from judicial
office. Id. at 282-84, 542 A.2d at 1353-54.
149. Id. at 284, 542 A.2d at 1354.
150. Id. at 287, 542 A.2d at 1356.
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dicial office because he had refused to answer inquiries before the
grand jury and had actively concealed information from federal
authorities. 15'
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re Cunning-
ham,' 52 upheld recommendations of the JIRB to remove or sus-
pend another eight judges for accepting cash gifts from the
Roofers' Union. The opinion is ambiguous and at times contra-
dictory. First, it is not clear whether the court relied on the intent
of the giver, the effect of the gift on the judge, or both in evaluat-
ing the propriety of a judge's acceptance of a gift.15 3 Second, the
court ultimately adopted neither the intent of the donor nor the
effect on the donee as a standard in judging gifts. Rather, the
court focused on an objective test of how such a gift would appear
to the public. 154 While cautioning against applying "an overly
scrupulous gloss" to the appearance of impropriety, the court
gave no indication how an improper appearance is to be
discerned. 155
151. Id. at 288, 542 A.2d at 1356.
152. 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988).
153. Id. at 430, 538 A.2d at 479-80. The court states:
That the value of the "fee, emolument or prerequisite" may appear de
minimis is of no significance if it was given and received to influence the
judicial officer in the performance of his or her judicial responsibilities.
The clear purpose of this provision is to assure the objectivity of the
jurist. Whatever the value of the token, if it is given and received to
secure a favored position for the donor with the jurist in the perform-
ance of his or her official responsibilities, the impartiality of the judg-
ment has been eroded and the integrity of the process destroyed
thereby. The question is not the intrinsic value of the thing offered but
rather its impact upon the actions of the jurist.
Id. This passage hints, at-the beginning, that the giver's intent is the sole crite-
rion, but, by the end of the passage, the emphasis has shifted to the impact of
the gift upon the judge's actions.
154. Id. The court states:
[E]ach jurist has the responsibility of not only avoiding an impropriety,
but also of avoiding the appearance of an impropriety .... [Wihen a
jurist is offered a gift by a litigant he or she must be aware of the possi-
ble appearance of an impropriety. Such gifts should not be accepted
unless a relationship exists, and the circumstances are such that a con-
clusion of wrongdoing cannot reasonably be drawn.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
155. By footnote, the court reversed a prior opinion which had held that a
judge's personal life is not subject to censure under the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Id. at 430-31 n.12, 538 A.2d at 480 n.12. In so doing, the court rejected
the contrary "implication" in In re Delassandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743
(1979) (judge's "open and notorious" meretricious relationship with a married
woman and his attempted appointment of her as chief cashier in court office, a
job. for which she was qualified, held not to violate the Code of Judicial Con-
duct). The Delassandro court had drawn a distinction between private moral be-
liefs and notions of acceptable social conduct on the one hand, and judicial
738
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How this "gloss" is applied has a significant impact on all
state court judges in Pennsylvania. Judges are elected in Penn-
sylvania. The resulting need to obtain campaign contributions
virtually assures that every Pennsylvania judge is now in danger of
removal because of campaign contributions from potential liti-
gants and counsel who appear in court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again grappled with the
significance of gifts to judges in In re Chiovero,156 another case
stemming from the Roofers investigation. The supreme court im-
plied that if Common Pleas Court Judge Chiovero did not know
that he received a free new roof courtesy of the Roofers' Union,
he would not be subject to removal.15 7 The court found the gloss
of improper appearance to be softer than that in In Re
Cunningham:
There is no evidence in the record before us to suggest
that any of the players in this roofing skit would ever be
litigants before [Judge Choviero] or that they were "po-
tential litigants." We cannot believe that the IJIRB]
views every human being on earth as a "potential liti-
gant" and that judges henceforth cannot interact with
any human beings.' 58
The court ordered Judge Chiovero to respond to an interro-
gatory describing completely the facts surrounding the installa-
discipline on the other. Id. at 458-59, 397 A.2d at 756-57. This line was no
longer clear nine years later, at least as to "matters in one's personal life which
legitimately reflect upon the jurist's professional integrity." In re Cunningham,
517 Pa. at 430 n.12, 538 A.2d at 480 n.12.
The Code ofJudicial Conduct contains no per se prohibition of gifts to judi-
cial officials. Its predecessor, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, did. Canon 32 of
the Canons ofJudicial Ethics provided: "Ajudge should not accept any presents
or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others
whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment." 425 Pa. xxiii-
xxxv (1965) (repealed and superseded by PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 455
Pa. xxix-xliv (1973)).
The 1990 ABA Model Code reintroduces a ban on judges accepting gifts.
MODEL CODE Canon 4D(5). There are a hefty number of exceptions including a
catch-all provision allowing a gift so long as "the donor is not a party or other
person who has come or whose interests have come or are likely to come before
the judge." Id. Canon 4D(5)(h).
156. 524 Pa. 181, 570 A.2d 57 (1990).
157. Id. at 197, 570 A.2d at 65.
158. Id. Chief Justice Nix dissented, arguing that precedent required an
appearance of impropriety standard be applied "where ajudge ... accepted a roof
worth over $2,000 as a gift from a union business manager, with whom he had
no previous relationship which could explain such a gift." Id. at 205, 570 A.2d
at 69 (Nix, CJ., dissenting).
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tion of his roof.'159 Nine months later, the supreme court
reinstated Judge Chiovero by a narrow 3 to 2 majority, crediting
the judge's new testimony that his mother-in-law, since deceased,
had paid $650 cash for the roof.160
The supreme court's crowded docket guarantees that only
the most notorious failures of trial judges to recuse themselves
are checked through the disciplinary process. Usually there are
other abuses that take precedence in the disciplinary process. In
1987, the supreme court did hear two recusal cases and, in both
cases, approved recommendations of the JIRB to remove the
judges from office. 16 1 In each case, the acts by the removed
judges went far beyond the appearance of impropriety.
In one case, 162 the court discussed ajudge's actions in eleven
cases involving, inter alia, improper communication with parties to
pending litigation, 163 abuse of criminal contempt powers, 164 im-
proper use ofjudicial office,165 failure to disqualify, 166 criticism of
159. Id. at 200, 570 A.2d at 66.
160. See The Never-ending Scandal, Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 21, 1990, at A22, col.
I (negative public reaction to case).
161. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink, 516 Pa. 208, 532 A.2d 358
(1987);Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 162-
68 & 169-71 respectively and accompanying text.
162. Fink, 516 Pa. 208, 532 A.2d 358.
163. Id. at 215-16, 532 A.2d at 361-62. The judge contacted a defendant
directly, without notice to the plaintiff, and suggested a particular defense which
had not been raised by the defendant. Id. at 215, 532 A.2d at 361. The judge
also met ex parte with the defendant's lawyer and gave the same advice. Id.
164. Id. at 215-23, 532 A.2d at 362-65. In a child custody case, the judge
met ex parte with the plaintiff's son, tried to get the plaintiff to drop his request
for the return of his runaway daughter, and criticized the plaintiff's lawyer. Id. at
216-17, 532 A.2d at 362. The lawyer for the plaintiff, when he learned of what
the judge had said, moved for recusal. Id. Four days later and without prior
notice, the judge summoned the plaintiff's lawyer to chambers, summarily held
him in contempt, and fined him $300. Id. at 222, 532 A.2d at 365.
165. Id. at 223-25, 532 A.2d at 365-66. The judge attempted to persuade
the district attorney, the state Attorney General, and a special prosecutor not to
prosecute two of his friends for withholding evidence. Id. at 223-24, 532 A.2d at
365.
166. Id. at 225-26, 532 A.2d at 366-67. The court held that the judge's
refusal to recuse himself in three cases violated Canon 3C(l)(a) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Id. at 226, 532 A.2d at 366-67. In one case, the judge sen-
tenced his former opponent's son to imprisonment on drug-related charges af-
ter an acrimonious campaign in which the judge had accused his opponent of
being soft on crime. Id. at 225, 532 A.2d at 366. Thejudgment of sentence was
reversed by the superior court and the case was remanded for a new trial before
another judge. Id. In another case, the judge said he hated the defendant-the
"damn gas company"-and, if he could find a way to rule against the gas com-
pany, he would do so. Id. In another case involving the gas company, the judge
threatened to hold counsel for the company in contempt if that attorney at-
740 [Vol. 36: p. 713
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 167 and interjection of religion
and religious bias in judicial proceedings.' 68
The second case 169 barred Common Pleas Court Judge Sny-
der from holding judicial office based on his actions in the Munici-
pal Publications trial. The court upheld the JIRB's findings that
Judge Snyder, inter alia, "presided at a hearing on a motion for his
own recusal, acting simultaneously as judge and as witness."' 70
Although Judge Snyder had lost his reelection bid since the Mu-
nicipal Publications trial, the court nevertheless stated that it had a
duty to give sanctions and therefore to bar him from holding any
judicial office in the future.' 71
The use of discipline to redress improperly decided recusal
motions is simply wrong. It does nothing for the case-in-chief,
which continues with the same judge. Moreover, the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is threatened by disciplinary bodies which
thereby acquire too much responsibility and power. 172 Only
tempted to present evidence of bias in support of a motion for recusal. Id. at
225-26, 532 A.2d at 366.
167. Id. at 226-28, 532 A.2d at 367-68. The judge called an opinion of the
supreme court "monstrous," "frivolous," and a "travesty." Id. at 227, 532 A.2d
at 367. The court found this behavior to be a violation of Canon 3A(6) (ab-
staining from public comment on pending proceedings), but declined to find in
these remarks any violation of Canon 2(a) (judges should respect and comply
with law and conduct themselves at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of thejudiciary). Id. at 228, 532 A.2d
at 367.
168. Id. at 228-31, 532 A.2d at 368-69. The judge frequently interjected
his religious beliefs into proceedings. Id. For example, the judge suggested that
a teenage boy before him in a delinquency hearing be examined by a local priest
to determine whether an exorcism was required. Id. at 228, 532 A.2d at 368.
Because of the judge's known religious "bias," parties who appeared before him
frequently professed their religious practices. Id. at 230, 532 A.2d at 369.
169. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294
(1987).
170. Id. at 145, 523 A.2d at 295.
171. Id. at 152-53, 523 A.2d at 299.
172. The Massachusetts Supreme Court said of this danger:
We cannot ... permit or encourage the use of the disciplinary power of
this court as the initial remedy for alleged error in judgment or abuse
of discretion by a judge. Attempts to correct judicial action in these
areas must be left to established methods of appeal.... To invoke the
disciplinary power of this court against a judge as a substitute for appel-
late review would establish a practice dangerous to the public's consti-
tutional right to an independentjudiciary. Moreover, permitting such a
procedure could encourage individuals or groups of individuals to take
action primarily for the purpose of intimidation.
In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 39-40, 300 N.E. 159, 173 (1973) (judge's conduct in
setting bail in 17 criminal cases criticized but not made basis for discipline; other
behavior such as lying under oath, neglecting judicial duties, using court officer
for personal work, and diverting charitable property to personal use warranted
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where the failure to recuse is flagrantly wrong and part of a pat-
tern of other violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct should
discipline be an appropriate initial response.
B. Impact of Proposed Judicial Disciplinary System on Pennsylvania
Recusal Standards
The Beck Commission's report, published in January 1988,
recommended a two-tiered judicial disciplinary system: The
Board of Complaints Regarding Judicial Conduct to receive and
investigate complaints against judges and The Court of the Judi-
ciary to adjudicate those complaints. 173 The Court of Judicial
Discipline, as renamed by the General Assembly, is to hold hear-
ings in public, in contrast to the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board which investigates and adjudicates complaints against
judges without publicity.174
While the proposed judicial disciplinary system differs from
the operation of the JIRB, it does not alter the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's rules on recusal. The new system will, however,
affect the influence of the supreme court on disciplinary matters.
It is likely that the issue ofjudicial reform will be presented to the
voters and approved by majority vote, and at that time, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court will lose influence in judicial disciplinary
matters in two major ways.
First, the supreme court's power of appointment will be cur-
tailed. There will be two bodies instead of a single board: ajudi-
cial Conduct Board to investigate complaints, and a Court of
Judicial Discipline to adjudicate complaints. 175 Unlike the Judi-
cial Inquiry and Review Board, of which the supreme court ap-
points 5 of 9 members, the Court of Judicial Discipline will not
have any members appointed by the supreme court.176 The gov-
ernor will appoint all seven judges of this new court, subject to
the approval of a majority of the state senate. 177 The Judicial
removal from office and disbarment from law practice). See also E. THODE, RE-
PORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1973) (neither discipli-
nary procedures nor penalties for violation of Code were within drafting
committee's scope).
173. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION 87, 94,
104-05 (1988).
174. H.B. 1, P.N. 166, 1991 Pa. General Assembly Sess. 8-10.
175. Id. at 4-10.
176. Id. at 8. For a discussion of the current constitutional provision, see
supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
177. H.B. 1, P.N. 166, 1991 Pa. General Assembly Sess. 8. The seven mem-
bers will be: "one active judge of the court of common pleas; one active judge
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Conduct Board, the investigatory body, will hold eleven mem-
bers, only three of whom are to be appointed by the supreme
court.' 7 8 The governor will appoint the remaining eight mem-
bers with the advice and consent of a majority of the state
senate. 179
Second, the supreme court's review of determinations of the
new Court of Judicial Discipline will be limited to matters of law
and not the independent, de novo review currently undertaken by
the supreme court when examining the recommendations of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.180
The effect of this reform will be to further politicize oversight
of the judiciary. The appointment and consent powers bring the
governor and state senate perilously close to control over judicial
tenure. The new court will have to reach assiduously for ways to
discipline judges to justify its existence.
The answer to the supreme court's influence over judicial
discipline in Pennsylvania, and particularly its shunting of recusal
to the disciplinary arena, is not necessarily to transfer its powers
to separate institutions. These separate institutions will be inher-
ently driven to discipline judges since judicial discipline is their
sole reason for existence. Nevertheless, the weight of the legal
profession and the lack of meaningful opposition (who would op-
pose disciplining judges other than judges themselves?) make it
likely that some sort of judicial disciplinary reform will emerge in
Pennsylvania within the next few years, despite the efforts of the
supreme court to retain exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over
the state judiciary. Perhaps then the supreme court will see rea-
son to return to the pre-Reilly standard that permitted lower
courts to rely on the Code of Judicial Conduct in reviewing
recusal determinations.
of an appellate court; one active justice of the peace; one non-judge member of
the bar of the Supreme Court; and three non-lawyer electors." Id.
178. Id. at 3. The supreme court will appoint one active judge of the court
of common pleas, one active judge of an appellate court, and one active justice
of the peace. Id.
179. Id. The governor will appoint three non-judge members of the
supreme court bar and six non-lawyer electors. Id.
180. Id. at 12. The supreme court shall review the record "as it would re-
view the record in a civil action in which the moving party in the lower court had
the burden of proving its allegations by clear and convincing evidence." Id. For
a discussion of the supreme court's standard of review for JIRB findings, see
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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IV. RECUSAL RULES ELSEWHERE
A. Overview
The use of a standard of actual impropriety for recusal iso-
lates Pennsylvania from the approach taken by many other juris-
dictions in the United States. Federal courts, under statutory
provisions and the due process clause, have unconditionally
adopted an appearance of impropriety test for reviewing motions
to recusejudges, and judicial discipline and recusal are not linked
as they are in Pennsylvania.' 8 1 There is even a federal statutory
procedure for a judge to refer recusal motions to another judge,
although it is not often used. 182 For the most part, the courts in
other states also use an appearance of impropriety standard to
review recusal decisions. 83
Pennsylvania also differs in its approach to recusal from many
foreign countries. Swiss and German laws, for example, contain
detailed rules concerning recusal requests. 84 In most cases, the
judge whose recusal is sought does not participate in the decision
on recusal, and the standard is again the appearance of impropri-
ety, not actual bias. 185
B. Federal Courts
Two separate strands of federal law exist with regard to judi-
cial recusal: constitutional and statutory. The constitutional
strand is based on due process, which is defined to include the
right to an impartial judge. The statutory strand sets more spe-
cific standards. Decisions on recusal generally deal entirely with
one body of law, ignoring the other. Courts more commonly rely
on the statutory strand in discussing recusal of federal judges.
1. Statutory Recusal Standards
Statutory recusal standards for federal judges are modeled
on Canon 3C of the Code ofJudicial Conduct. The standards are
181. For a discussion of the federal standards, see infra notes 186-259 and
accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of this federal procedure, see infra notes 190-93 and
accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of the recusal standards of other states, see infra notes
272-99 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of the recusal standards of Switzerland and Germany,
see infra notes 300-61 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the recusal procedures of Switzerland and Ger-
many requiring the non-participation of the judge whose alleged bias is at issue,
see infra notes 315-21, 331-33, 341, 351-54, & 359-61 and accompanying text.
744 [Vol. 36: p. 713
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/1
1991] RECUSAL STANDARDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 745
contained in two places-sections 455 and 144 of title twenty-
eight of the United States Code. Section 455 is more commonly
invoked, probably because it has fewer procedural requirements.
Borrowing from Canon 3C(1), section 455(a) states: "Any
justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned."'18 6 Four of the five other, more specific
grounds for recusal in section 455(b) are also lifted directly from
Canon 3C. 187 In addition, like the model code and unlike the
Pennsylvania code, section 455(e) permits a judge to waive
recusal with the consent of the parties.188 The Pennsylvania Code
186. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). The present controlling language of § 455
was inserted in 1974. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-412, 8 Stat. 1609
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988)). See also S. 1064, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 38, 47 (1974). Before then, the section gave considerably
narrower grounds for recusal, providing:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or
has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907, 908 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1988)).
The first federal recusal legislation, adopted in 1792, required disqualifica-
tion of district judges where they were "concerned in interest" or had been of
counsel in the case before them. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275,
278-79. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 387 n.52 (describes statutory evolution for
federal judicial recusal legislation).
By 1911, the statute had taken the general form in which it was to remain
until 1974 except that the grounds for disqualification on the basis of relation to
counsel was omitted. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988)). The 1948 version simplified
the 1911 language and omitted instructions as to how a judge's disqualification
should be recorded and certified. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907,
908 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988)).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) comes from Canon 3C(l)(a) (personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed facts); (b)(2)
comes from Canon 3C(l)(b) (served as counsel, or associate served as counsel,
or was material witness); (b)(4) comes from Canon 3C(1)(c) (judge in individual
capacity or as fiduciary, spouse or minor child residing in household has finan-
cial interest that could be substantially affected by outcome of proceeding; Penn-
sylvania's Code, 455 Pa. xxix, xxxv (1973), by comparison, requires "a
substantial financial interest"); (b)(5) comes from Canon 3C(1)(d) (personal in-
terest of judge, spouse or related person). Section 455 contains only one
ground for recusal that is not in Canon 3C-service in governmental employ-
ment as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding before
the court, or expression of an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy while in governmental employment. 28 U.S.C, § 455(b)(3)
(1988).
188. Section 455(e) allows a waiver of a ground for disqualification under
subsection (a) so long as it is preceded by "full disclosure on the record of the
basis for disqualification." 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1988). Section 455(0 states that
ajudge may divest any financial interest he or his spouse or minor child residing
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lacks any provision for waiver of grounds for recusal. 189
Section 144 gives litigants the possibility of getting a differ-
entjudge to determine a recusal motion if the motion alleges that
the assigned judge is personally biased or prejudiced either
against a party or in favor of an adverse party.' 90 This section,
which has no counterpart in the Code of Judicial Conduct, estab-
lishes circumstances which require referral of a recusal motion to
anotherjudge. The standard, unlike that set by Pennsylvania case
law, is not a subjective and extraordinary standard under which
referral is mandated only where the judge decides to testify on
the recusal motion. Rather, the only requirement is a "timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pend-
ing has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor
of any adverse party .. .."191 The affidavit under section 144
must be filed not less than ten days before the "beginning of the
term" at which the proceeding is to be heard unless good cause is
shown. 192 Only one such affidavit is permitted to be filed in any
with him has in a party or a matter before him where the conflict came to his
attention after he has devoted substantial judicial time to the matter and the
interest could not be substantially affected by the outcome of the matter. 28
U.S.C. § 455(l) (1988).
Judges may not turn their eyes away from knowledge of their financial inter-
ests, however, since § 455(c), like its counterparts in Canon 3C(l)(c) and Penn-
sylvania Code ofJudicial Conduct Canon 3C(2), states that judges should inform
themselves about their personal and fiduciary financial interests and make a rea-
sonable effort to do so with regard to the financial interests of their spouse and
minor child residing with them. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (1988).
The 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct is stricter in its provisions for
waiving disqualification. Canon 3D authorizes "remittal" of disqualification only
in cases involving financial interest of ajudge, his spouse or minor child residing
with him as well as where a relative of the judge is a party, lawyer, likely material
witness, or holder of an interest that could be substantially affected by the out-
come of the proceeding. In such cases, disclosure on the record of the basis of
the disqualification is necessary as well as the written, filed consent of the parties
and lawyers in the proceeding. 1972 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3D, in MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, App. C at 35 (1990). For a discussion
of changes to the Model Code, see supra note 2.
189. Where the trial judge has as much discretion as he does under Penn-
sylvania law, however, the existence of a waiver provision with consent of the
parties is unlikely to have much significance.
190. Section 144 states in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
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case. 193
The United States Supreme Court construed section 455 in
Lileberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 194 Addressing issues that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consigned to the discipli-
nary process, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in a 5 to 4
decision, held that "[s]cienter is not an element of a violation of
section 455(a)."' 95 Thus, according to the Court, a federal judge
need not be aware of the disqualifying circumstance to violate the
federal recusal standards.
While acknowledging that there could be a violation of sec-
tion 455 that would be harmless error, 196 the Court suggested the
following criteria for determining whether a judgment should be
vacated for a violation of section 455: "the risk of injustice to the
parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will
produce injustice in other cases and the risk of undermining the
public's confidence in the judicial process."' 197
In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court held that the judge, a trustee
of a university which stood to benefit if Liljeberg prevailed,
should have recused himself from a declaratory action to deter-
mine the ownership of a corporation.19  Liljeberg was negotiat-
ing with the university to buy land on which to build a hospital.199
The negotiations hinged, according to the Court, on Liljeberg
prevailing in the declaratory action. 200 The Court emphasized
that the judge had received letters from the university about the
negotiations, some of which mentioned the case pending before
him.20 1
However remote the judge's own financial interest was in the
outcome of the action and the university's negotiations, the Court
193. Id. Section 144 additionally requires a certificate of counsel stating
that the affidavit is made in good faith. Id.
194. 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (judge disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) be-
cause of his membership on board of university which was in negotiation with
party involved in case before him).
195. Id. at 859. The violation discussed in Liljeberg was whether the judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned" by other parties. Id. According
to the Court, the judge's knowledge of the board's involvement with a party was
not required. Id. The judge's involvement in the proceeding constituted a vio-
lation of § 455(a) regardless of his knowledge. Id.
196. Id. at 862. The Court gave large, multidistrict class actions as an ex-
ample of where harmless error could occur. Id. at 862 n.9.
197. Id. at 864.
198. Id. at 850.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 858.
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still found that the judge's failure to recuse himself violated sec-
tion 455(a), 455(b)(4) and perhaps 455(c).202
The Supreme Court, in affirming the court of appeals deci-
sion, applauded the court of appeals' "willingness to enforce sec-
tion 455" and encouraged "a judge or litigant to more carefully
examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly
disclose them when discovered." 20 3 The Supreme Court agreed
with the court of appeals that the trial judge should have granted
the motion to vacate thejudgment, which was filed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)20 4 some ten months after the
court of appeals had affirmed the judgment.2 0 -5
Liljeberg, through a motion to vacate the judgment, redressed
a violation of federal recusal standards in a civil case after the ap-
peal period had run. The standard of review by the court of ap-
peals as well as the Supreme Court was a de novo examination of
whether there was an appearance of impropriety. 20 6
Two cases decided after Liljeberg in the Second and Third Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal reflect the close scrutiny mandated by
Liljeberg for reviewing recusal motions in the federal courts. Both
202. Id. at 867-68. The judge's position as university trustee, according to
the Supreme Court, gave an appearance of partiality in violation of § 455(a); it
also constituted a financial interest in the proceeding because of the judge's fi-
duciary duties as trustee, a violation of § 455(b)(4); and the judge's failure to
stay informed of his fiduciary interest "may well" have been a separate violation
of § 455(c). Id.
203. Id. at 868.
204. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a judge, upon motion and such terms as are
just, to relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding "for... any... reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
205. 486 U.S. at 850. The Supreme Court attributed the ten month delay
to the judge for his failure to recuse himself or disclose the conflict upon gaining
knowledge of it. Id. at 869.
The case came to the Supreme Court after the court of appeals had heard
the issue for the second time. Id. at 851. In its first review, the court of appeals
determined that factual findings were required to determine the extent and tim-
ing of the trial judge's knowledge of the university's interest in the litigation. Id.
The appellate court remanded the matter to a different district judge for such
findings. Id.
The judge to whom the matter was remanded found that the trial judge had
known of the university's interest in the subject matter of the case before it went
to trial, but had forgotten about this interest prior to the commencement of the
proceedings and the filing of his opinion. Id. The judge hearing the remand
concluded that "the evidence nevertheless gave rise to an appearance of impro-
priety." Id. He, however, denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Id. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the appearance of impropriety was sufficient to
disqualify the trial judge under section 455(a). Health Services Acquisition
Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1986).
206. 796 F.2d at 800-02; 486 U.S. at 684.
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cases were based on interlocutory mandamus petitions and were
not ordinary appeals after final judgment.
In Moody v. Simmons,20 7 the Third Circuit case, a bankruptcy
judge repeatedly told the parties that he would recuse himself,
but declined to do so until he had granted a petition to convert
the bankruptcy petition from chapter 7 to chapter 11. 208 The
judge's daughter worked for the second largest unsecured credi-
tor of the bankrupt company, and her employer would benefit
from the conversion. 20 9 The Third Circuit granted a writ of man-
damus and vacated the judge's orders, relying on the district
judge's announced intentions during hearings that he would re-
cuse himself from the case.2 10
The Second Circuit case, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. ,21 1 involved civil fraud actions brought
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and individual
plaintiffs against an underwriting firm in the aftermath of the Ivan
Boesky insider trading prosecution. 212 Judge Milton Pollack, who
heard the Boesky matter, received the individual plaintiff cases in
August 1987 and presided over a year of "substantial" pretrial
activity-issuing three published opinions, thirty-six management
orders, and resolving a host of procedural and discovery
matters.213
In September 1988, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action
against Drexel Burnham Lambert and others which was assigned
to judge Pollack.2 14 Drexel's lawyers then moved to recuse judge
207. 858 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988).
208. Id. at 139-40.
209. Id. at 139, The judge's relationships with two attorneys were also
brought to the judge's attention as further grounds for his recusal. First, two
defendants in the bankruptcy cases were represented by the same law firm that
was representing a defendant in a personal injury action that the judge and his
wife had recently filed in state court. Id. Second, the wife of an attorney for the
trustee of the bankrupt company was employed in a law firm which also repre-
sented another defendant in the judge's personal injury suit. Id. The appellate
court, however, gave no indication that these relationships alone would suffice
to require recusal. Id. at 142-43.
210. Id. at 142-44. The case was remanded for assignment to another
judge. Id. at 144. The Third Circuit panel also took the unusual step of sug-
gesting that "in light of the animosity that appears to have arisen between the
district judge and the two petitioning law firms, the district judge may wish to
consider not sitting on cases involving these firms in the future." Id. at 144 n. 11.
211. 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988).
212. Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel) was charged, with others, with act-
ing in concert with Ivan Boesky to violate securities and anti-racketeering laws.
Id. at 1310.
213. Id. at 1309-10.
214. Id. at 1311. The complaint alleged that Drexel and others had corn-
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Pollack from the Drexel litigation and the Boesky litigation on the
grounds that the judge's wife was a controlling stockholder in a
company for whom Drexel was to act as an underwriter in the sale
of its business, and that Drexel had the option to buy fifteen per-
cent of the new company to be formed as a result of the transac-
tion. 21 5 Although the sale agreement occurred in June 1988,
Drexel's lawyers claimed they first became aware of the financial
interest ofJudge Pollack's wife in September 1988-after the SEC
had filed the complaint. 216 Drexel's counsel also alleged a second
ground for recusal: personal attacks by the judge on the integrity
of Drexel's counsel.2 1 7
The Second Circuit declined to issue the writ, upholding
Judge Pollack's refusal to recuse himself. First, the court found
that the financial interests of Judge Pollack's wife lacked any
nexus with the suits pending before the judge and did not involve
any business dealings with Drexel.21 8 Second, according to the
court, the challenged remarks made by the judge were directed to
the professional conduct of the attorneys, did not extend to extra-
judicial matters, and did not reflect prejudice or lack of impartial-
ity regarding the parties to the action.2 19 The court stated:
"[B]ias against a lawyer ... without more is not bias against his
client."220 If, after trial, bias was found to have "permeated" the
case, that situation could be corrected on direct appeal.22'
Both of these cases, although differing in result, applied an
appearance of impropriety standard.22 2 In addition, these cases
mitted federal securities laws violations, including fraudulent insider trading and
stock manipulation. Id.
215. Id. at 1310-11.
216. Id. at 1311. Judge Pollack's wife had a $30 interest in the sale. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1314. The court held that, because Drexel had no direct or indi-
rect obligation to Mrs. Pollack, Judge Pollack's connection was too remote to
require recusal. Id. at 1315. Holding otherwise would mean that"the price of
avoiding any hint of impropriety, no matter how evanescent, would grant liti-
gants the power to veto the assignment of judges." Id.
219. Id. at 1316.
220. Id. at 1314 (citations omitted). According to the court, "[d]ecisions or
rulings must be adverse to a party and legal disagreements with counsel are not
sufficient for judicial disqualification . Id.
221. Id. at 1316.
222. Federal cases before Liljeberg also applied this standard. See, e.g., In re
Beard, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987) (writ of mandamus to disqualify district
judge rejected after detailed review of allegations); Hall v. Small Business Ad-
min., 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983) (law clerk's prior employment in Small Busi-
ness Administration and acceptance of job from plaintiff's counsel while
working-on employment discrimination case required magistrate to recuse him-
self from case; case remanded for new trial before judge or another magistrate);
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show a willingness to examine recusal issues in interlocutory ap-
peals, and neither case even begins to hint that recusal issues
should be left to the judicial disciplinary process.
2. Due Process
Early common law recognized direct pecuniary interest as the
sole basis for judicial disqualification.2 23 In 1813, Justice Living-
ston and Chief Justice Marshall reportedly disqualified them-
selves, each in a different case, because they had direct pecuniary
interests in matters before the court.22 4 In addition, federal trial
judges were disqualified by statute from hearing cases in which
they had a financial interest as early as 1792.225 Neither common
law nor statutory law, however, made bias or prejudice grounds
for judicial disqualification. 22 6
Not until the twentieth century did the principle evolve that
parties have a constitutional right to an impartial judge.227 Even
today, the Constitution is still less commonly relied on than are
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976)
(in response to mandamus petition which sought to disqualify district judge in
antitrust action, court held total facts required case to be tried by judge from
outside district).
223. See Tumey v. Ohio, 237 U.S. 510, 528-31 (1927) (general rule is that
officers acting in judicial capacity are disqualified by their financial interest in
controversy).
224. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813)
(Chief Justice Marshall did not participate); Livingston & Gilchrist v. Maryland
Ins. Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 506 (1813) (Justice Livingston did not participate).
The case reports do not reflect the reasons for their nonparticipation, setting a
standard followed to this day by Supreme Court justices. Commentators, how-
ever, assure us of the justices' financial interest in these cases. See White, The
Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REv. 1, 13 n.52 (1984)
(because Marshall was member of syndicate who brought original action to quiet
title, he had strong interest in outcome of case and felt he could not openly
participate); Frank, supra note 1, at 609 (practice of Supreme Court justices dis-
qualifying themselves in cases in which they had direct pecuniary interest
originated by Justice Livingston and immediately followed by Chief Justice
Marshall).
225. For a discussion of the federal recusal statutes, see supra note 186-93
and accompanying text.
226. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986) ("tradi-
tional common law rule was that disqualification for bias or prejudice was not
permitted"; more recent trend is towards adoption of statutes to permit disqual-
ification on these grounds).
227. For a discussion of constitutional grounds for judicial recusal, see infra
notes 228-59 and accompanying text. Justice Frankfurter eloquently expressed
the need for judicial impartiality to be guaranteed by the Constitution in his
dissent in Sacher v. United States:
Bitter experience has sharpened our realization that a major test of
true democracy is the fair administration of justice. If the conditions
for a society of free men formulated in our Bill of Rights are not to be
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statutory grounds for recusal. While the federal Constitution is
replete with checks and balances intended to prevent abuses of
political power, it is silent regarding the obligation ofjudicial im-
partiality. The Constitution also lacks sanctions against federally
appointed civil officers, including judges, other than their im-
peachment from office. 2 28
The framers may have considered an impartial judge to be an
inherent element of natural law that needed no restatement. It
was part of their implicit faith that individuals appointed or
elected to public office would seek to carry out their duties hon-
estly and fairly. James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers: "No
man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt
his integrity." 22 9 Another possibility is that the framers consid-
ered judicial impartiality to be outside the scope of the Constitu-
tion and adequately covered by common law or statute.
The Constitution nevertheless shows that judicial impartiality
was of concern to the citizenry. The Bill of Rights guarantees an
accused in a criminal case, and both parties in a common law civil
case, the right to trial by jury rather than by ajudge.230 The Con-
stitution itself provides for trial by jury for all crimes prosecuted
in federal court except impeachment.231 The jury was the colo-
nial citizen's constitutional remedy to avoid the biased or inter-
ested judge.
In the twentieth century the U.S. Supreme Court began to
apply the Constitution to prohibit federal judges from deciding
cases in which they had a personal stake, usually a financial inter-
est. Most of these cases involved criminal prosecutions.
turned into mere rhetoric, independent and impartial courts must be
available for their enforcement.
343 U.S. 1, 23 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dissenting to affirmance of
summary contempt convictions for 11 defendants, all of whom were leading
members of the United States Communist Party).
228. The only constitutional sanction against federal officers provides:
"The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States shall be
removed from office on Impeachment for, and Commission of, Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
230. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "In suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury shall be other-
wise reexamined in any Court of the United States than according to the rules of
the common law ... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
231. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
jury ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 3.
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Prohibition statutes engendered Tumey v. Ohio,2 3 2 the first
major case from the Supreme Court linking due process and judi-
cial impartiality. An Ohio statute provided that fines from per-
sons convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor could be used to
finance the enforcement of prohibition laws. 23 3 The Village of
North College Hill provided by ordinance that the mayor, who
decided prohibition cases, would receive a part of the fine col-
lected as compensation for hearing such cases in addition to his
regular salary.234 The mayor received such money only if the de-
fendant was convicted. 235 In addition, the only provision for
funding the marshalls, inspectors and detectives who enforced
the prohibition law was the fines collected from convicted
defendants.236
Chief Justice Taft held that the Ohio statute and the village
ordinance violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due
process of law:
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal
bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.
But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and
... due process of law, to subject his liberty or property
to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a di-
rect, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case.23 7
At the time Tumey was decided, there were many statutes giv-
ing public officials and public coffers a financial interest in the
criminal conviction of the defendant. 23 8 The Tumey Court, how-
ever, concluded "that a system by which an inferior judge is paid
for his service only where he convicts the defendant has not been
so embedded ... that it can be regarded as due process of law
232. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
233. Id. at 517.
234. Id. at 519.
235. Id. at 520. The mayor would receive the amount of his costs from
hearing the case if the defendant was convicted. Id. "There is, therefore, no way
by which the mayor would be paid for his service as judge if he does not convict
those who are brought before him ... Id.
236. Id. at 520.
237. Id. at 523 (citation omitted).
238. See id. at 527-32 (Court gave examples of cases which involved com-
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.... ,239 Tumey was thus the first case to apply the due process
clause to the recusal of judges.240
For a long time the Supreme Court confined the application
of due process in recusal matters to judges with a personal finan-
cial interest in the proceeding. However, in 1955, the Supreme
Court held that due process was violated when a state judge de-
cided criminal contempt charges related to testimony he had
heard while acting as a one-man grand jury pursuant to state
law. 24 1 Applying the principle that "no man can be ajudge in his
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome," the Supreme Court overturned the
criminal contempt conviction of two individuals for their re-
sponses in a grand jury hearing about suspected gambling and
bribery of policemen.2 42
Thus, a judge's previous involvement in a criminal prosecu-
tion as "a part of the accusatory process" was added to financial
interest as grounds for the reversal of convictions in order to as-
sure due process of law.243 "[O]ur system of law," Justice Black
wrote in a 6 to 3 opinion, "has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness" and not simply "an absence of ac-
tual bias in the trial of cases." 244 For the first time, the Supreme
Court endorsed "the appearance of justice" as the appropriate
standard for recusal. 245
Another Ohio statute, which authorized mayors to sit as
judges in cases of ordinance violations and certain traffic offenses,
provided the Supreme Court with a further occasion to link due
process to the principle of judicial impartiality.2 46 Even though
the fines went to the village treasury and not to the mayor person-
ally, the Supreme Court found a lack of due process of law be-
cause of the possible temptation for the mayor, sitting as traffic
239. Id. at 531.
240. The Court held that any procedure which offers temptation to a judge
and which therefore might affect his impartiality denies due process of law. Id.
at 532.
241. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955).
242. Id. at 134, 136, 139. Michigan, situs of the inquiry, then authorized a
judge to act as a so-called "one-man grand jury." Id. at 133. Acting as such, a
judge could compel witnesses to testify in secret about suspected crimes. Id.
243. Id. at 137.
244. Id. at 136. The Court stated that an "interest in the outcome" could
not be defined with precision; circumstances and relationships have to be con-
sidered. Id.
245. Id. The Court noted that this standard could sometimes bar judges
who had no actual bias from trying cases. Id.
246. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
[Vol. 36: p. 713
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court judge, to convict the defendant in order to maintain the
traffic court's high level of contributions to the village treasury. 247
The most recent Supreme Court decision applying the due
process clause to judicial recusal where a judge has a financial
interest in the outcome of a case is Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lav-
oie.248 In Aetna, a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court partici-
pated in reviewing a $3.5 million verdict against an insurer for its
bad faith refusal to pay a medical insurance claim, despite the
pendency in state court of two actions filed on the judge's be-
half.249 One suit was against a different insurance company alleg-
ing bad faith failure to pay the judge's own insurance claims; the
other suit was a class action on behalf of all Alabama state em-
ployees insured under Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama.2 50
Aetna's counsel challenged the justice's participation after learn-
ing of these pending suits. 25' The Alabama Supreme Court had
denied the recusal motion.252
As to the insurer's allegations that the justice was biased and
prejudiced, the United States Supreme Court held that the jus-
tice's "general frustration with insurance companies" was insuffi-
cient to establish any constitutional violation.253 However, by
affirming the jury's verdict of punitive damages in the amount of
$3.5 million, the largest punitive damages award ever in Alabama,
ChiefJustice Burger stated that the Alabama Supreme Court "un-
doubtedly raised the stakes" for the insurer in the justice's own
suit.254 This interest made the Alabama justice "a judge in his
own case" when he participated in the decision, regardless of
whether in fact he was influenced "not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true." 255
247. Id. at 60. According to the Court, "the test is whether the mayor's
situation is one 'which would offer a possible temptation to the average man...
which would lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused .... .Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927)).
248. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
249. Id. at 816-17.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 819 (discussing Alabama Supreme Court's unreported order of
March 8, 1985).
253. Id. at 821.
254. Id. at 824.
255. Id. at 824, 825 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,
60 (1972)). The Alabama justice was the determining vote in affirming the
award of punitive damages, a fact highlighted by ChiefJustice Burger, id. at 828,
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Therefore, under Aetna, the due process clause of the federal
constitution is violated where a judge acts as a judge in his own
case or where he reaps a tangible financial benefit by deciding the
case in a certain way. In these situations, actual bias need not be
shown to vacate a judgment in which the judge participated.2 56
The United States Supreme Court, in Aetna, declined to ad-
dress the issue of a due process violation because of alleged judi-
cial bias or prejudice where the judge is not financially interested
in the outcome of the case. 257 The Court noted the recent trend
to adopt statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice,
and in this connection, cited the Code of Judicial Conduct. 258
Only "in the most extreme of cases," however, "would disqualifi-
cation on this basis be constitutionally required . *."..259
3. Discipline and Recusal
Federal judges hold office for life "during good behavior. '260
They may be removed from office only on a majority vote to im-
peach by the House of Representatives and after trial by the
Senate. 26' Recusal complaints, however, have not figured promi-
nently in recent judicial impeachments.
The federal Constitution grants no powers to the United
256. Chief Justice Burger wrote in Aetna:
We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice
Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before
the Supreme Court of Alabama "would offer a possible temptation to
the average... judge to... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true." The Due Process Clause may sometimes bar trial by judges
who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales ofjustice equally between contending parties. But to perform its
high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."
Id. at 825 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972), In re
Marchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). See also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.
858, 876 (1989) ("Among those basic fair trial rights that can never be treated as
harmless is a defendant's right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury.").
257. Id. at 821.
258. Id. at 820. Under the Code, a judge should disqualify himself where
he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. Id. (citing ABA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(a) (1980)).
259. Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
260. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
261. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, cl. 5, 3, cl. 6. A two-thirds vote of senators
present is required to convict under impeachment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
The last three impeachment trials of federal judges were conducted by a
committee of 12 Senators. See Stewart, Impeachment by Ignorance, 76 A.B.A. J. 52
(June 1990). The committee needed a quorum ofjust seven to hear testimony.




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/1
RECUSAL STANDARDS IN PENNSYLVANIA
States Supreme Court to discipline federal judges of lower courts.
Administratively though, the federal court system has exercised
informal oversight over judges. In 1969, Chief Justice Warren
created an Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities
which was composed of federal judges. 262 The committee's task
was to give informal, nonbinding opinions on matters of judicial
conduct to the circuit judicial councils, the informal body that in-
cludes all federal judges within each federal judicial circuit. 263
The advisory committee still publishes opinions or refers to its
previous opinions on judicial conduct upon written request from
federal judges.264 The committee, however, has no authority to
impose sanctions. 265
In 1980, Congress authorized each federal circuit to resolve
complaints ofjudicial misconduct. 266 Even before then, however,
as one federal circuit judge has pointed out, the Administrative
Office Act of 1939 had empowered the judicial councils to take
action as necessary to ensure "that the work of the district courts
shall be effectively and expeditiously transacted. '" 26 7
The 1980s witnessed some 1,650 complaints against federal
judges, but only four public reprimands or censures. One circuit
executive has claimed, however, that at least nine federal judges
or magistrates retired after a complaint was filed against them or
when one was imminent. 268 Some commentators dislike the con-
fidential nature of the responses of the judicial circuit committees
to complaints of misconduct.2 69 Others (mostly judges) believe
262. See The Joint Committee on the Code ofJudicial Conduct of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, A Review of the Activities ofjudicial Conference
Committees Concerned with Ethical Standards in the Federal Judiciary, 1969-1976, 73
F.R.D. 247, 252 (1977).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 254-55, 258-59.
265. Id. at 255-56.
266. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331,
332, 372, 604 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986)).
267. Edwards, supra note 1 at 792 (quoting the Administrative Office Act of
1939, the author notes that legislation, as well as judicial practice before 1980,
authorized federal courts to take informal disciplinary measures against federal
judges).
268. See Staib, Regulation of Judicial Conduct Praised and Criticized, 15 LrrIGA-
TION NEWS 4 (Feb. 1990).
269. See, e.g., Margolick, A Glimpse at the Secrets of Penalizing Judges, N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1989, at A1, col. 1 ("[T]he mechanism Congress devised nearly
10 years ago to punish judges for improprieties that do not merit impeachment
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that the formality brought by the 1980 Act has increased the
number of frivolous complaints without contributing much
else.2 70 Even so, the circuit committees in federal courts probably
do not receive as many complaints about recusal as does the disci-
plinary body for Pennsylvania judges, the Judicial Inquiry and Re-
view Board.271
C. Other State Courts
No uniform procedures for judicial recusal exist for state
courts, but most states have adopted the Code of Judicial Con-
duct with little or no modification. 272 The following cases from
270. Edwards, supra note 1, at 789. ChiefJustice Wald of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed that the Act "has not proven
its worth as a vehicle for unearthing real judicial misconduct." Id.
271. Ten complaints were filed about federal judges with the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1988. See Brennan, Federal Judicial Discipline Questioned, Legal
Intelligencer, Aug. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Seven of them were dismissed by Chief
Justice Gibbons as having come from litigants dissatisfied with a particular deci-
sion. See id. Statistics identifying the nature of complaints about judges filed
with theJIRB are not publicly available. TheJIRB initiated 325 inquiries during
1990; another 173 matters were pending. The JIRB dismissed 39 matters fol-
lowing formal investigation and rejected another 289 matters as frivolous. Four
matters were referred to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with recommenda-
tions for formal discipline. See Letter of Feb. 13, 1991 from JIRB to Administra-
tive Office of Pennsylvania Courts (copy on file with author).
272. Only Montana, Rhode Island and Wisconsin have not enacted the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Montana has a statute on judicial disqualification of trial judges for personal
bias or prejudice. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805 (1989). As does 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1988), the Montana statute provides that on the filing of a timely affidavit alleg-
ing facts showing bias or prejudice, another judge must be assigned to deter-
mine the recusal motion. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805(1). In the case of district
judges, the chief justice of the state supreme court assigns a district judge to
hear the matter. Id. For judges of municipal courts, small claims courts andjustice of the peace courts, any district judge may appoint another judge orjus-
tice of the peace to hear the matter. Id. The affidavit must be filed more than 30
days before hearing or trial, and attorneys' fees, costs and damages may be as-
sessed by the judge presiding at the disqualification proceeding "against any
party or his attorney who files such disqualification without reasonable cause and
thereby hinders, delays or takes unconscionable advantage of any other party, or
the court." Id. § 3-1-805(a), (d). Montana also requires judicial disqualification
in all of its state courts in cases where the judge is a party, interested, related to
either party within the fourth degree by marriage or blood, counsel or sat in a
lower court on the matter appealed. Id. § 3-1-803.
Rhode Island is the only state which retained the 1924 canons of judicial
ethics. Canon 4, relating to recusal, states: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. A judge should
avoid infractions of law. A judge's personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of his judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach." R.I. SuP. CT. R. 48 (Michie 1991).
Wisconsin's statute for disqualification ofjudges follows the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 3C(l)(b), (d) and (). See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.19
46
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Alabama, Florida and the District of Columbia reflect the use of
the appearance of impropriety test for recusal and do not rely on
the disciplinary process for review of recusal determinations.
In Ex parte Rollins (Grace v. Reed), 2 73 the Alabama Supreme
Court granted a mandamus petition to require a trial judge to
recuse himself from a civil action because of a personal conflict
between the judge and the petitioner's counsel.2 74 Some twenty
months before the filing of the recusal motion, the judge had filed
a complaint against petitioner's counsel with the state bar associa-
tion alleging that the lawyer was unfit to practice law.275 The
complaint was dismissed four months after it was lodged. 276 Re-
viewing the papers filed by the judge, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the judge still harbored "some negative feelings
toward" petitioner's counsel.2 77 The court, also pointing to two
recent matters involving the judge and counsel in which the judge
had recused himself, held that the evidence showed the judge was
biased against counsel and required his recusal.278
The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama decided another
recusal case involving relationships between parties and judge in
Ex parte Sanders (Sanders v. Head).279 The writ of mandamus to re-
assign a case involving modification of a child custody decree was
denied by the court where the grounds for recusal were that the
assigning judge had taken a vacation in Reno, Nevada with the hus-
band and children involved in the case. 280 Since nothing had
been alleged to challenge the judge to whom the case had been
assigned, the court declined to issue a writ for assignment to an-
(2)(a)-(d) & (f) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (judge disqualified if he or she is
relative of party or counsel, is party or material witness in proceeding, is former
counsel in same proceeding or prepared legal paper whose validity is at issue, or
has significant financial or personal interest in outcome). Wisconsin also re-
quires recusal when "a judge determines that ... he or she cannot, or it appears
he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner." Id. § 757.19(2)(g). The statute
establishes a nonexclusive link with the judicial disciplinary process in stating
that, "[i]n addition to other remedies, an alleged violation under this section or
abuse of the disqualification procedure shall be referred to the judicial commis-
sion . . . ." Id. § 757.19(6).
273. 495 So. 2d 636 (Ala. 1986).
274. Id. at 637.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. According to the court, the answer filed by the judge attempted to
prove that his accusations against petitioner's counsel were justified. Id.
278. Id. at 638.
279. 521 So. 2d 56 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
280. Id. at 56.
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other judge.28' Had, however, the assigning judge known of the
child custody proceeding and nevertheless gone on the trip with
the husband, "the impartiality of the entire legal process-in view
of the totality of these circumstances-might well have been seri-
ously compromised in the eyes of the public. . ." so that manda-
mus might have been the appropriate remedy.2 82
At first glance, this requirement of actual partiality seems
contrary to Liljeberg's standard for the federal courts. However,
the judge involved in Sanders was not the trial judge but the as-
signing judge. Therefore, the court relied primarily on Canon 2
of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics which dealt with the
general conduct of judges, rather than on the recusal standards
of Canon 3.283
A Florida appellate court issued a writ of prohibition di-
recting a trial judge to recuse himself from a medical malpractice
case where the judge had expressed sympathy with the plaintiff, a
child suffering from cerebral palsy.2 84 Also, the plaintiff's coun-
sel was a longtime friend of the judge and the two had engaged in
ex parte communications in two previous trials of the same case
where almost all rulings favored plaintiff.2 85 The trial judge had
denied the motion to recuse solely for the reason that it was un-
timely.28 6 The appellate court disregarded this reason, noting
that the trial was scheduled at a later date so that the motion
would not interfere with the orderly progress of the case. 287 The
appellate court stated that the test was "how [ ]the litigant reason-
ably view[s] the remarks or conduct of the judge." 288 By this
standard, the court found that recusal was required.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals wrestled with the
281. Id. at 58. In denying the writ, the court stated: "[W]e are unable to
conclude that [the assigning judge's] continuing presence in this case in any way
compromises the judicial process in the case or creates the appearance of impro-
priety such that his recusal is mandated." Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 57-58.
284. Deren v. Williams, 521 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
285. Id. at 151.
286. Id. at 151-52.
287. Id. at 152.
288. Id. Applying this test, the court concluded:
While few persons would not be sympathetic to the plight of a child
afflicted with cerebral palsy, . . . the continued expression of that
sympathy and the manifestation of a close friendship with opposing
counsel, coupled with ex parte communications during trial, would rea-
sonably cause a litigant to be apprehensive of the fairness of the trial
judge.
[Vol. 36: p. 713
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issue of recusal where a defendant contended that the court
should set aside his conviction of assault with intent to kill as well
as his sentence because, unknown to the defendant, the judge had
interviewed for a job with the prosecutor's employer during the
trial and sentencing.289
The court assumed that the judge had violated Canon 3C(1)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.290 The court, however, said it
would grant a remedy only if due process was denied. 29 1 Relying
on criminal law cases, the court found that the violation was
harmless error and had not affected the defendant's substantial
rights. 292 According to the court, the appearance of partiality was
not enough to violate due process; the defendant must show ac-
tual prejudice such as adverse rulings on crucial issues. 293
Finding no prejudice during the trial, the court panel de-
clined to order a new trial. 29 4 The court did, however, remand
for resentencing. 295 Since the trial judge had already left the
bench for employment with the Department of Justice, the resen-
tencing was to be conducted by another judge.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reheard this case
en banc.29 6 The entire court agreed with the panel's decision that
the trial judge had violated Canon 3C(l) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct by applying for employment with the prosecutor's em-
289. Scott v. United States, 536 A.2d 1040, 1042 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 543
A.2d 346 (D.C. 1988), rev'd on reh'g, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1989) (en banc). The
judge had applied for employment as a managerial attorney with the Executive
Office for United States Attorneys. 559 A.2d at 747. While this office is respon-
sible for providing policy and oversight guidance to all federal prosecutors, the
division to which the judge had applied was not concerned with criminal litiga-
tion. Id.
290. 536 A.2d at 1045.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1046-48.
293. Id. at 1047-48. The court gave the following as examples of situations
which would be due process violations: where the judge denies a motion to
suppress or other motion on which the conviction stands on the basis of credibil-
ity findings adverse to the defendant; where the judge as factfinder makes critical
rulings adverse to the defendant during trial; or where the judge otherwise con-
ducts the trial in a manner which might be perceived as motivated by actual bias.
Id. In dictum, the court stated that prejudice could be shown inerely by estab-
lishing that the case was tried by a judge rather than jury. Id. at 1048.
294. Id. at 1049. The defendant had admitted that the judge was not actu-
ally biased against him. Id. at 1046.
295. Id. at 1049.
296. Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1989). Thejudge who had
authored the panel's decision was a retired judge who did not participate in the
rehearing. Id. at 746. The other two judges from the panel joined the rest of the
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ployer during the trial and sentencing.297 However, it rejected
the panel's use of due process and actual prejudice as standards
for granting a new trial for violation of Canon 3C(1) of the Code.
Instead, the court en banc held that an "objective" standard of im-
partiality must control the remedy as well as the finding of a viola-
tion of Canon 3C(1).298 Even though the trial judge did not sit as
trier of fact in the criminal case, a new trial was necessary "to
assure the continued public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary." 299
D. Two Foreign Jurisdictions
The recusal laws of foreign jurisdictions reflect rules that are
similar to federal and sister states' laws in that a neutral judge
decides most recusal motions under a standard of appearance of
impropriety, not actual bias. The methodology of comparative
law used here is functionalist.30 0 Two continental law systems-
Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany-share a com-
mon goal with the American legal system: the need to protect
and guarantee judicial impartiality. As does the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Switzerland and Germany both distinguish between in-
terest and bias. In Switzerland, a constitutional provision is used
to evolve rules similar to the interpretation of the due process
clause in the United States. Germany, despite having a constitu-
tional provision nearly identical to Switzerland's, relies more on
detailed procedural rules set forth in statutes for deciding recusal
requests. Neither country uses discipline as a way to control
recusal determinations.
1. Switzerland
Swiss recusal law is cantonal, with federal law intervening
only on matters of constitutional dimension.
Article 58 of the federal constitution of Switzerland states in
relevant part: "No one may be deprived of his lawful judge."3 0'
297. Id. at 756.
298. Id. at 748-49.
299. Id. at 755-56.
300. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOETZ, 1 EINFUEHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVER-
GLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIET DES PRIVATRECHTS 34 (1984) (authors of this
respected treatise on comparison of law in field of private law suggest that intro-
ductory question for every inquiry into comparative law be put functionally in
order to formulate the problem free of systemic concept of one's own legal
order).
301. See THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 71, 193 (Transl. C.
Hughes 1954).
762 [Vol. 36: p. 713
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Originally intended to prevent cantons from establishing special
courts in which to try political opponents, the Swiss federal
supreme court, the Tribunal f6d6ral, has relied on this provision
often in reviewing recusal decisions.302
In its decision of November 17, 1987, Firm A v. Firm B and
Appeals Court of the Canton of Zurich, 30 3 the civil division of the Tri-
bunal f~d6ral explained Article 58: "According to the more re-
cent decisions of the Tribunal f~deral, the individual has the right
from Article 58 of the Constitution to demand the judgment of
his dispute by an impartial and independent court."3 04 The stan-
dard for Article 58, said the court, "is not that the judge [whose
recusal is sought] must actually be partial; it is enough that cir-
cumstances exist which could raise in a party the impression of
partiality." 30 5 The court held that a remand of the case to the
same arbitrator who initially arbitrated the matter did not itself
create such circumstances, so it rejected the appeal of Firm A.30 6
In a decision of July 15, 1988, Y v. Spouse X, the President of the
Regional Court Z, and the Appeals Court of the Canton of Thurgau,30 7 the
public law division of the Tribunal f~d~ral applied Article 58 to
require a judge's recusal. The trial judge had obtained personal
knowledge concerning a case pending before him while he was on
a drill as a volunteer fireman.308 Mrs. X had filed a judicial com-
plaint against her spouse Y to deny him a building permit on the
grounds that Y's "hobby repair shop" created an impermissible
burden for pedestrians and vehicular traffic and an impermissible
noise level for her adjoining property. 30 9 The president of the
Regional Court, while on a volunteer fireman's exercise, observed
that the repair shop of Y was still in use after 8 p.m. 310 Thejudge
walked around the shop, talked briefly with Y's son and sent each
party a copy of his notes for the case file. 3 1 ' Y then petitioned to
302. For examples of this reliance, see infra notes 303-33 and accompany-
ing text.
303. 113 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS (BGE I)
407 (translations by the author).
304. 113 BGE I 407, 408 (citation omitted).
305. Id. at 409.
306. Id. at 410. The Tribunal f6d6ral used the same standard for arbitra-
tors as for judges because of the requirement of equal treatment for disputants.
id.
307. 114 BGE 1 153.
308. Id. at 154.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 154, 159-60.
311. Id. at 154.
1991] 763
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remove the notes from the file and to recuse the judge.31 2
The trial court at the Regional Court (Bezirksgericht) is ordina-
rily composed of a panel of judges and in this case the president
judge participated in the decision to reject the recusal petition. 313
The first issue was whether the president judge's participation it-
self required reversal of the Regional Court's decision. 314
The intermediate court of the Canton of Thurgau held that
this procedure was improper and the Tribunal f6d6ral agreed.315
"No one can be an impartial judge when his own case stands to be
decided," stated the Tribunal f~deral, "[a]nd this incapacity ap-
plies also for the case of a recusal petition. ' 31 6 The Tribunal fed-
eral held, however, that the error was cured by the independent
decision of the appellate court so long as no cantonal law ex-
pressly prohibited such participation.31 7 The Tribunal f~d~ral
distinguished this result from a previous criminal case in which
the Tribunal f~deral had vacated the judgment. In the previous
case, the cantonal procedural law had prohibited participation of
the judge whose recusal was sought, and the reversal was thus
based on cantonal law, not federal constitutional law.3 18
Examining the recusal petition on the merits, the Tribunal
f~dral held that recusal was required.31 9 Although the president
judge's personal knowledge of the case from his observation and
conversation with Y's son did not show partiality (especially since
the judge had made a file notation of the event and sent it to both
parties), the evaluations of the case reflected in the president
judge's notes could create the impression that the outcome of the
case was no longer open. 320 The Tribunal f~dral held that Arti-
cle 58 compelled the judge's recusal from the case.32'
312. Id. at 154-55, 159 (petition sought recusal on grounds that judge's
behavior while visiting Y's property and content of his notes reflected bias
against Y).
313. Id. at 155.
314. Id. at 156.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 157.
318. Id. at 156-57 (discussing decision of April 2, 1987, H v. Canton of
Schaffhausen; court gave no further citation).
319. Id. at 163.
320. Id. at 161. The president judge wrote that the noise was "aggravating,
in spite of the distance," and that the constant flashes of soldering were "very
clearly annoying." Id.
321. Id. at 163. The complainant also relied on Article 6 of the European
Human Rights Convention, guaranteeing a lawfully constituted court. Id. at
155. The court, however, did not address the applicability of the Convention.
764 [Vol. 36: p. 713
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Other decisions of the Tribunal f dral on recusal refer to
Article 58 and to statutory rules governing recusal.3 22 The statu-
tory rules are not federal law but are established in the court or-
ganization statutes of each canton with the exception of the
Tribunal fedral, the sole federal court in Switzerland.
Zurich's Law on Court Organization3 23 contains provisions
similar to Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but it also
provides court procedures for recusal requests.3 24 It prohibits
taking gifts from a party or in connection with a pending
322. See, e.g., M v. X and Z, decision of September 6, 1988 of the criminal
division of the Tribunal f6dral, 114 BGE 1 348 (where filing of motion to recuse
judge was delayed until trial, even though grounds were previously known, tim-
ing of motion violates good faith and criminal code as well as Article 58); X v.
City of Zurich, Governing Council of the Canton of Zurich and Administrative
Court of the Canton of Zurich, decision of September 7, 1988 of the public law
division of the Tribunal fd&ral, 114 BGE I 278 (Article 58 and Article 4 of
federal constitution give party right to know which judges participated in decid-
ing recusal petition; party violates good faith by delaying recusal petition until
appeal where grounds for knowledge existed earlier); H v. P.W.S.A., Appellate
Judge M, Appellate Judge G, General Prosecutor and Appellate Court of the
Canton of Bern, decision of March 29, 1989 of the public law division of the
Tribunal fd&ral, 115 BGE I 34 (judge who ruled in related criminal case not
required to recuse himself under Article 58 of federal constitution or Article 6 of
European Human Rights Convention although if it had been criminal case,
judge who approved charges and/or supervised discovery would not be allowed
to decide case).
323. GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ (GVG) (Staatskanzlei Zurich 1979).
324. The essential terms in Sections 95 and 96 of the Law on Court Organi-
zation provide:
95. A judge, jury member, prosecutor, official or justice of the
peace is excluded from carrying out his duties-
1. in cases involving himself, matters of his spouse or fiancee,
his natural or adopted or marital relatives in direct relationship
and through to the fourth degree of relationship; also when either
he or these persons can expect an indemnification or contribution
suit;
2. in matters of his ward or his foster child;
3. when he participated in a decision on the matter below as
well as when he acted as agent or ordered judicial acts on the
matter;
4. when he accepted a gift or allowed a promise to be made by
a party or a third person in connection with the matter.
96. Also each [such] judicial official [referred to] in section 95 can
be rejected or can demand his own exclusion-
1. in matters of an entity in which he is a member other than
belonging to the state or community;
2. when he gave or will give advice as an intermediary, expert
or witness;
3. when between him and a party there exists friendship, en-
mity or an obligational or dependent relationship;
4. when other circumstances exist that make it appear he is
partial.
GVG at 20-21 (Staatskanzlei Zurich 1979).
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matter.32 5
The Zurich law assigns disputed recusal petitions to the su-
pervisory authorities of the court 326-in the case of most trial
courts, this means the appellate courts. Appellate courts decide
the recusal petition themselves but without participation of the
judge against whom recusal is sought. If no quorum is obtaina-
ble, the Cantonal Council (an executive body) decides the peti-
tion.3 2 7 Under Zurich's law, supervisory authorities can take
disciplinary measures and may direct the matter to another judge
or court division if a judge has refused to apply law or has delayed
the decision in a case.3 28 There is no specific provision that sub-
jects Zurich's judges to the threat of discipline for wrongly decid-
ing a recusal petition.
A federal statute, the Court Organizational Law,3 29 estab-
lishes the rules for seeking recusal of judges of the Tribunal
f~dral and other federal officials including prosecutors, court re-
porters, investigating judges and jury members. This law has
provisions similar to Zurich's law on recusal except that it omits
any prohibition of gifts and extends the bar on hearing relatives'
cases only to the second degree rather than the fourth degree of
kinship.33 0
Disputed requests for the recusal of judges on the Tribunal
f~d~ral are decided by the president judge or, if the basis for ex-
clusion is disputed, by the entire court panel without the partici-
pation of the judge whose recusal is sought. 3 'l If there is no
quorum to decide the recusal petition, the president judge ap-
points the required number of substitute judges from the presi-
dent judges of cantonal appellate courts which are not involved in
the matter.33 2 This body decides the recusal request and, if nec-
essary, the underlying case.33 3
2. Germany
German procedural law follows the system of specialized
325. Id. § 95(4).
326. Id. § 101.
327. Id.
328. Id. § 108.
329. ORGANIZATIONSGESETZ.
330. Id. art. 22, 23, reprinted in W. HABSCHEID, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVIL-
PROZESS-UND GERICHTSORGANISATIONSRECHT 109, 111 (1986).
331. Id. art. 24, 26.
332. See W. HABSCHEID, supra note 330, at 110.
333. See id.
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courts prevalent in Germany. 33 4 Each specialized court is a uni-
fied system governed by federal law for each type of court: civil,
criminal, labor, administrative, social welfare, patent, tax and con-
stitutional. The Code of Civil Procedure33 5 and the Code of
Criminal Procedure"36 contain rules on recusal for litigation in
the ordinary courts for civil and criminal matters. In contrast with
Switzerland, there are no state laws on judicial recusal.
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz) proclaims in lan-
guage similar to its Swiss counterpart that "[n]o one can be de-
prived of his lawful judge."3 3 7 The Federal Constitutional Court,
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has stated that arbitrary action on a re-
quest to recuse a judge can violate this constitutional provi-
sion.3 3 8 The constitutional law on recusal, however, is relatively
sparse. Most cases on recusal are decided on the basis of the stat-
utory rules.3 3 9
The Civil Procedure Law, like the Zurich cantonal law, sepa-
rates recusal into cases where it is mandatory (exclusion or Aussch-
luss) and instances in which the exercise of discretion is required
(rejection or Ablehnung). There are six mandatory recusal
grounds: (1) the judge is a party or shares "a duty, right or bears
liability" with a party; (2) the matter concerns the judge's spouse,
even if the marriage no longer exists; (3) the matter concerns a
person with whom the judge is directly related or is related by
blood to the third degree of kinship or in the case of relation by
marriage to the second degree regardless of whether still so re-
lated; (4) the judge is or was a legal advisor or litigator for a party;
(5) the judge was heard as a witness or an expert in the matter; or
(6) he participated as a judge or arbitrator in an earlier decision in
334. The Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 (Einigungsvertrag) between
West and East Germany, BGBI.II at 889 (dated Aug. 31, 1990), stipulated in
Article 8 that the federal law of the Federal Republic of Germany would take
effect on October 3, 1990 in the territory of the five new states comprising the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic unless otherwise provided
in the Unification Treaty. German procedural law is federal and it became effec-
tive in the five new states on October 3, 1990 without changes regarding the
treatment of recusal decisions.
335. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (ZPO).
336. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (STPO).
337. GRUNDGESETZ (GG) art. 101.
338. See B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU & F. KLEIN, KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ
FUER DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1048 (6th ed. 1985) (citing cases and
commentary in support of Federal Constitutional Court's decisions).
339. See Schlichting, Vorbefassung als Ablehnungsgrund, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHE (NJW) 1343, 1344 (1989).
1991]
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the case unless by appointment to take discovery.3 40
Recusal on grounds of partiality is discretionary and is based
on whether there is a reasonable appearance of partiality, not
proof of actual bias. The Civil Procedure Law states that rejec-
tion is justified when "a reason exists which is sufficient to justify
mistrust of the impartiality of a judge."3 4 1
The court decides the recusal request without participation
by the affected judge.3 42 As in Switzerland, most German trials
are conducted by panels ofjudges. If the court lacks a quorum to
decide the recusal request, the next higher court determines
whether recusal is justified.3 43 The judge whose recusal is sought
must provide a formal response.3 44
A denial of a request to recuse in a civil case can be appealed
by an immediate interlocutory complaint (Beschwerde), filed within
two weeks of service of the order.3 45 The appeal is decided by the
next highest court and there is no further appeal.3 46
Recusal in criminal cases is governed by the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Although the standards are the same as those for
civil cases, there are some additional restrictions on the use of
requests to recuse judges.3 47
First, unless the circumstances at the time are reasonably un-
known and the request to recuse is made as soon as the facts be-
come known, no request based on alleged partiality can be made
after the defendant starts to testify at trial.3 48 If the recusal con-
cerns an appellate judge, it must be made before the speech of
the reporting judge begins.3 49 No request to recuse a trial judge
is permitted once the defendant has finished testifying.350
Second, the judge whose recusal is sought participates in the
340. ZPO § 41(l)-(6).
341. Id. § 42(2).
342. Id. § 45.
343. Id. § 45(2). The exception is the municipal court (Amtsgericht), where a
single judge is the rule. The ZPO provides that the next higher court, the Lan-
dgericht, will decide requests to recuse municipal judges unless the municipaljudge grants the request. Id.
344. Id. § 45(3).
345. Id. §§ 46(2), 77(2).
346. Id. § 568.
347. STPO § 22, 24.
348. Id. § 25.
349. Id. The head of the panel appoints one judge as reporting judge to
present the court's summary of the case at appellate argument. T. KLEINKNECHT
& K. MEYER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 918, 975 (36th ed. 1983); R. ZOELLER,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 2173-74 (13th ed. 1981).
350. STPO § 25.
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decision on whether the request should be rejected on procedural
grounds. 35' In cases where normally only one judge sits, that
judge alone decides whether such procedural grounds for rejec-
tion of the request exist. 352 The procedural grounds for rejection
are: (1) untimely filing; (2) no reason given for recusal or no
prima facie evidence presented; or (3) the only apparent purpose
is delay or the pursuit of non-trial purposes. 353 Decisions on the
third ground must be unanimous and reasons must be given.354
If the request to recuse a judge in a criminal matter is not
denied as impermissible on one of the three procedural grounds
listed above, the court decides the recusal request without the
participation of the judge whose recusal is sought.355
Appeals of a refusal to grant recusal in criminal cases may be
made by way of complaint (Beschwerde), filed with the appellate
court within one week after the denial of the recusal request.3 56
As for judges who are sitting only for the purpose of taking testi-
mony, an appeal against their failure to recuse themselves is per-
missible only with the appeal against the judgment. 357
Most reported decisions on recusal are decisions on com-
plaints. These decisions are from the courts of appeals, not the
highest courts. Recusal issues also appear on occasion in deci-
sions of the highest nonconstitutional courts but only rarely in the
Federal Constitutional Court.358 This court, the interpreter of
351. Id. § 26a.
352. Id. Examples of when one judge might sit include cases where a single
judge is requested to take discovery in another jurisdiction (ersuchter Richter) or is
asked by the presiding judge to hear testimony alone (beauftragter Richter). In
Germany, as in other civil law countries, there is no pretrial discovery by the
parties. For this general observation in the American literature, see Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (1985).
Rather, evidence is taken over a series of hearings. Id. When oral testimony is
taken, the judge asks most of the questions. Id. at 828-29. See also Kaplan, von
Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure H, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1443,
1471 (1958).
353. STPO § 26a(1).
354. Id. § 26a(2).
355. Id. § 27(1). In the case of a municipal court judge (Amtsrichter), an-
other municipal judge decides the request rather than as in civil cases, sending it
to the next higher court, the Landgericht. Id. § 27(3).
356. Id. § 28(2). If the judge has failed to recuse herself, in violation of a
mandatory ground for recusal (exclusion or Ausschluss), an appeal on this issue
may be a part of an appeal against the judgment. Id. § 338(2). No appeal is
permitted where a request to recuse is granted. Id. § 28(1).
357. Id. § 28(2).
358. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has decided recusal requests directed to-
wards its own justices according to rules established in the Law for the Federal
Constitutional Court. GESETZ UEBER DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT § § 18-19.
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the Basic Law, has not taken a major role in the jurisprudence on
judicial recusal.
Nevertheless, in addressing whether one of its members
should be disqualified from hearing an asylum case, the Constitu-
tional Court stated that its court rules, in order to justify recusal,
do not require "that the judge be actually one-sided or partial or
whether he thinks he's partial.3 59 Rather, what is decisive is
whether a party, reasonably evaluating all the circumstances, has
reason to doubt the impartiality of thejudge."3 60 That the justice
had spoken out publicly for restricting the constitutional right to
asylum did not show partiality; there must be statements sug-
gesting law reform relating concretely to a pending proceeding
before there will be doubt as to the justice's impartiality.36 1
German jurisprudence does not link judicial discipline with
judicial recusal. Such a link is unlikely where the procedural rules
require judges in most instances to defer the recusal issue to their
colleagues on the same court or the next higher court. Where an
interlocutoi-y appeal is permitted, the time limits are extremely
short and no further appeal is permitted, so the issue is resolved
promptly.
Despite the different rationales for judicial recusal in Switzer-
land and Germany, their procedures and standards resemble each
other and American practice outside of Pennsylvania. The Penn-




Recusal rules are intended to ensure that the presiding court
Its provisions are similar to those in the civil and criminal procedure codes; the
result, however, is different. If a justice is disqualified by his colleagues, a re-
placement justice from the other panel of the court is chosen by lottery. Id.
§ 19(4). The Bundesverfassungsgericht is composed of 16 justices divided evenly
into two panels. Id. § 2.
359. Decision of Oct. 1, 1986, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE), NJW
429 (1987).
360. Id.
361. Id. In one respect the Constitutional Court is more secretive than its
American and Swiss counterparts. No one knows the names of the justices on
the panel of three who decide which of the 3,000 constitutional complaints filed
each year will be accepted. See Ein Schichtes Ende, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, May 5, 1988, at 16. Only two percent of these complaints are accepted.
Id. Therefore, what is in most cases the initial resort to the Constitutional Court
takes place without the opportunity to seek recusal because the names of the
justices on the review panel are not made public. Id.
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is impartial and disinterested in the case at hand. This protects
individual litigants and promotes public confidence in the judici-
ary. Effective redress for litigants is best achieved by having an-
other judge decide the motion in cases where bias is alleged, and
by allowing review of the recusal determination either on an in-
terlocutory basis or with review of the final judgment.
Where only public confidence is sought, and not impartiality
in particular cases, judicial discipline alone becomes a logical
course of action; so long as biased or interested judges are even-
tually removed from the bench, the public will arguably be satis-
fied with the integrity of the judiciary. Discipline becomes less
relevant once neutral judges decide the recusal request.
The Code of Judicial Conduct makes recusal mandatory
when the judge has a designated type of interest in the case and
discretionary in cases where a party claims that the judge is un-
duly prejudiced or biased. Recusal rules in Switzerland and Ger-
many do the same. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in contrast
to the courts of other jurisdictions examined in this article, gives
the power to decide the issue of recusal to the very judge against
whom the claim is brought. To do otherwise, the argument runs,
would result in a flood of recusal motions under which the wheels
of justice would spin out of control. Moreover, according to the
argument, judges are persons of integrity who can be counted on
to recognize if they had better step aside.
Some may argue that the administrative costs of referring
recusal motions to neutral judges would be too high. This argu-
ment is not compelling. Controls on timing and frequency of
recusal motions can reduce the cost. Moreover, delayed justice is
better than taking the risk of a partial decisionmaker. Most liti-
gants will undoubtedly prefer an impartial judge in their own case
to a disciplinary complaint against the judge later.
B. Appellate Review
It would be congruent with the goals of ensuring public con-
fidence in courts and guaranteeing impartiality of judges to use
the "appearance of impartiality" standard in reviewing recusal re-
quests. The standard promoted in Pennsylvania by the supreme
court, however, is actual prejudice or bias.
The timing of the recusal motion is important for the availa-
bility of appellate review. The later the motion occurs in the case,
the less cause exists to permit direct review. The concern, how-
ever, should be with ensuring that litigants promptly raise
1991]
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grounds for recusal when they become aware of them. For exam-
ple, the United States Supreme Court in Liljeberg gave no signifi-
cance to the fact that the motion was first raised ten months after
entry of judgment. To avoid case delays, interlocutory review
should be available under strict time limits.
C. False Assumptions
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rules imply that a judge
recusing herself means that she has acted immorally. Public deci-
sionmakers are no longer judged on utilitarian, pragmatic
grounds, but by moral codes and public cries for discipline and
punishment of errant public servants.
The perception of unfair judicial criticism can also lead to
restrictions on the freedom of the press. In December 1990, a
Philadelphia jury awarded a supreme court justice six million dol-
lars, finding that the Philadelphia Inquirer libeled the judge when a
reporter wrote that the justice should have recused himself from a
case where his impartiality was questioned. 362 The justice's law-
yer argued that accusing the justice "of being partial, that's accus-
ing him of a crime." 363 This moralistic perception has come to
dominate the public outlook on elected and appointed officials.
In the context of recusal requests at least, this view is questiona-
ble. That a judge is related to a litigant, holds stock in a corpora-
tion that files suit, or even intensely dislikes a particular litigant is
not a basis for moral condemnation or discipline. Every person is
passionately interested in one matter or another, and in such cir-
cumstances, recusal is no cause for disgrace.
Heedless of human nature in other respects, the state
supreme court puts too much faith in judges. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reveals a childlike trust that a judge will do
no wrong. Why not put into place basic self-controls to avoid
abuse of judicial power rather than tempt judges by giving them
the power to decide if they are biased or interested themselves?
There are other possible explanations, less flattering to the
courts, for the supreme court's unique approach to recusal mat-
ters. By giving trial judges nearly carte blanche power to decide
recusal motions while leaving disciplinary reins free, the justices
increase their power over the judicial system. To have other
362. Philadelphia Paper Loses Libel Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, at A24 (dis-
cussing the ury verdict in McDermott v. Philadelphia Inquirer, No. 262 (C.C.P.
Phila. Dec. 7, 1990) which is now on appeal).
363. Id.
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judges review recusal motions might tempt the lower court judges
to use it as a way to exercise power for themselves or to cast ill-
will on a fellow judge. Judicial discipline and removal, however,
can prematurely end a judge's term. From this perspective, the
proposed new judicial disciplinary system is designed to dilute
the supreme court's disciplinary powers over state judges.
The lack of attention given to Pennsylvania's backward
recusal rules can be explained, but not justified, by the values now
in vogue in public life. We have become moralists in our expecta-
tions of public servants by putting too much faith in the integrity
of individual judges and too little faith in the integrity of the judi-
cial system and the courts as a whole.
A challenge facing Pennsylvania's judicial system is to return
to recusal standards based on ordinary judicial processes and to
turn away from the sensationalist resort to judicial discipline. To
accomplish this the public must change its demands on judges
from the divine to the human scale. At the same time the legisla-
ture-if the courts themselves are unwilling-must curtail the ex-
cessive powers lodged with individual judges and the supreme
court by specifying fair procedures for the determination and re-
view of recusal requests outside of the disciplinary process.
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